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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent startup ventures that are based on new models made possi-
ble by the Internet and mobile technologies have upended a range of
industries, including taxi services, retail sales, and hotels.  They typi-
cally offer convenience and low cost to consumers and job and income
opportunities for producers.  They are investment targets for large
and small investors and have made their founders very wealthy.
Some companies that use these new models have grown at such a
rapid pace that their market capitalization far exceeds that of tradi-
tional companies located within those industries.1  An example of this
is the housing services company Airbnb, which is valued at $26 billion,
more than the hotel chain Marriott and its competitor, Hilton.2  These
companies, thriving in a new transnational economy that is connected
1. For a description of the scope of the Sharing Economy, see PwC, THE SHARING
ECONOMY (2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-
consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
QD7K-Z2ND].
2. Alison Griswold, Airbnb is Thriving.  Hotels are Thriving.  How Is That Possible?,
SLATE (July 6, 2015 6:00 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/
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virtually, are doing what many would call disrupting the normal way
of doing business in these industries, offering services to the consumer
in a more efficient and effective manner directly through the Internet
and mobile technologies.3  They are unleashing latent assets that can
be deployed in new, innovative, and lucrative ways.  These new eco-
nomic actors, and the networks and platforms they have created, have
become significant drivers of economic activity and made their foun-
ders very rich, while attracting billions of dollars from investors.
For lack of a better term, many of these companies operate within
what many call the “sharing economy.”4  Not surprisingly, they have
faced stiff resistance from their more traditional counterparts, indus-
try incumbents who face significant encroachments on their customer
bases and profits.  Government actors are struggling to keep up with
these new business models, and the activities of these companies can
raise significant consumer protection concerns.5  Indeed, consumer
protection watchdogs raise concerns about product and service
safety.6  While consumers appreciate the panoply of choices and the
fact that sharing economy platforms often offer a lower cost for prod-
ucts and services than traditional providers, safety concerns and a ret-
icence to trust relatively unregulated platforms threaten to
undermine their growth and profitability and are driving some juris-
dictions to heavily regulate or ban certain enterprises outright.7
Elected officials and other government actors share consumer protec-
tion concerns and also raise fears that new models of product and ser-
vice delivery can sidestep tax- and fee-generating mechanisms, like
2015/07/airbnb_disrupting_hotels_it_hasn_t_happened_yet_and_both_are_thriv
ing_what.2.html [https://perma.unl.edu/A8QY-D6NM].
3. There is some debate over whether platforms like Uber are merely sustaining
existing industries or truly disrupting them. See Clayton M. Christensen et al.,
What Is Disruptive Innovation?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2015) https://hbr.org/2015/
12/what-is-disruptive-innovation [https://perma.unl.edu/CUW5-QA87].
4. For a discussion of the definitional issues around the “sharing economy,” see in-
fra Part II.
5. Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government Policy:
The Future of Local Regulation of the ‘Sharing Economy,’ GEO. MASON U. L. &
ECON. RES. PAPER SERIES, Jan. 14, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2549919 [https://perma.unl.edu/6C9L-VX4D] (describing potential
local government approaches to regulating the sharing economy).
6. The Opportunities and Risks of the Sharing Economy: Hearing on “The Disrupter
Series: How the Sharing Economy Creates Jobs, Benefits Consumers, and Raises
Policy Questions” Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 5–8 (2015) (statement of Dean
Baker, Co-Director, Center for Economic and Policy Research) (describing con-
sumer protection concerns with sharing economy businesses).
7. For a description of the challenges Uber has faced in Germany, for example, see
Mark Scott, Uber’s No-Holds-Barred Expansion Strategy Fizzles in Germany,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/technology/ubers-
no-holds-barred-expansion-strategy-fizzles-in-germany.html?_r=0.
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hotel taxes and licensing fees collected from providers within these
industries.8  Labor leaders and workers fear the erosion of traditional
worker protections in sharing economy platforms.9  The founders and
leaders of these sharing economy companies bristle over calls for regu-
lation, saying any such effort will stifle the entrepreneurial spirit and
innovation.10  The search is on for the right level of oversight that will
regulate these new economic models effectively without chilling inno-
vation or harming consumer and worker interests.11
What proponents and detractors alike fail to recognize is that the
sharing economy—for lack of a better term—can learn from an indus-
try that has struggled, over the centuries, to find the right balance
between innovation and oversight.  This sector has shared features of
these new economic actors and has experimented with and put into
place regulatory components that attempt to find the sweet spot be-
tween regulation, consumer protection, and creativity.  Indeed, one in-
dustry has exhibited the features of the sharing economy for centuries
and has developed a regulatory approach that attempts to strike a del-
icate balance between consumer protection and provider indepen-
dence.  Like sharing economy platforms, it has involved the provision
of on-demand services by independent actors that have tapped into
latent assets to serve a range of customers at the same time.  It has
organized itself primarily through outsourcing, where providers offer
services to customers based on reputation.  The customer is free to
change service providers, generally, at will; the customer pays for ser-
vices as needed and in accordance with his or her use of those services.
8. Ann Carrns, Lodging Taxes and Airbnb Hosts: Who Pays, and How, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/your-money/lodging-taxes-
and-airbnb-hosts-who-pays-and-how.html?_r=0 (describing hotel taxes paid by
Airbnb hosts in different jurisdictions).
9. Robert Reich, Why the Sharing Economy is Harming Workers—and What Must
Be Done, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 28, 2015, 12:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/robert-reich/why-the-sharing-economy-i_1_b_8672120.html [https://perma
.unl.edu/QND8-8EWA] (discussing workers rights concerns in the sharing econ-
omy).  While the issues surrounding worker rights and interests are considerable,
and I am personally cognizant and sympathetic to these concerns, this Article
will focus on consumer interests and not on issues concerning worker rights.  For
a critical view of the sharing economy and its effects on worker interests, see
STEVEN HILL, RAW DEAL: HOW THE “UBER” ECONOMY AND RUNAWAY CAPITALISM
ARE SCREWING AMERICAN WORKERS (2015).
10. Sofia Ranchordas, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the
Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413 (2015) (describing the need to
balance innovation with the need for regulation).
11. Sarah Cannon & Lawrence H. Summers, How Uber and the Sharing Economy
Can Win Over Regulators, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/
10/how-uber-and-the-sharing-economy-can-win-over-regulators&cm_sp=Article-
_-Links-_-End%20of%20Page%20Recirculation [https://perma.unl.edu/Q8AM-
U983] (arguing “[r]egulation is often the most significant barrier to future growth
for sharing economy firms”).
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In these ways, the sharing economy, whether consciously or uncon-
sciously, is borrowing features from the manner in which the legal
profession has delivered legal services in the United States since the
birth of the nation.  As the legal profession grew and its role became
more central in the functioning of the economy and society, finding the
right balance between consumer protection, innovation, and regula-
tory oversight has been a central theme in the evolution of the profes-
sion’s regulation.
The major components of legal professional oversight have not
changed much over the last 100 years or so.  These components are
designed to encourage both zealous advocacy and creativity while en-
suring quality control and consumer protection.  In fact, the elements
of this balance have always been seen through the lens of a sort of
legal profession exceptionalism—the notion that there is something
different about the practice of law that requires a zealous vigilance
around the frontiers of oversight and that regulation of the profession
must be undertaken in such a way that will protect the important role
the legal profession plays in ensuring the proper functioning of Ameri-
can democracy.12  It is perhaps no accident that there is a similar ex-
ceptionalism that now permeates the debate around regulation of the
sharing economy—the notion that disruptive innovation in a range of
industries, designed to supercharge the economy, unleash capital, cre-
ate opportunity for millions, and improve consumer access should not
be held down by stifling regulatory oversight.
A more recent development that can also inform questions regard-
ing the most efficient and effective way to regulate the sharing econ-
omy has been the emergence of so-called “New Governance” models of
regulatory oversight.  Developed in response to changes in technology,
economic forces, globalization, and a need to make regulatory systems
more experimental, adaptive, transparent, and responsive, New Gov-
ernance models promote an engaged dialogue among stakeholders:
regulators, the regulated, and consumers.13  They straddle the gov-
ernment, private, and civil society sectors in a search for optimal ap-
proaches to regulation that encourage innovation while protecting
consumers.  Interestingly, just as the sharing economy shares features
of the legal profession in the U.S., the regulatory infrastructure that
governs the legal profession has itself developed through an approach
that has many of the hallmarks of New Governance Theory, long
before its emergence as a theory.  Indeed, this infrastructure, which
12. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics in an Adversary System: Some Persis-
tent Questions, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 655–61 (2006) (describing relative regu-
latory independence of the legal profession and the impact it has had on actor
accountability within the regulatory system).  See infra subsection III.B.1 for a
discussion of these themes in greater detail.
13. See infra Part IV.
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hinges on a self-regulatory model, has been experimental, decentral-
ized, iterative, and adaptive.
Because the legal profession shares so many features of the shar-
ing economy and has wrestled with many of the same questions with
which actors inside and outside the sharing economy now struggle,
lessons learned through centuries-long development of the rules and
protections governing the legal profession can help inform the debate
over the need for (and contours of) any coming regulatory oversight of
the sharing economy.  Moreover, as the manner in which the legal pro-
fession has been regulated over the last two centuries exhibits many
of the hallmarks of New Governance approaches to regulation, one can
also consider New Governance models in any approach to regulation of
the sharing economy.  Thus, this Article analyzes the evolution of reg-
ulation of the legal profession in the United States to unearth lessons
from that evolution and draw insights that might inform approaches
to regulating the sharing economy and strike a balance between inno-
vation and consumer protection.  These prescriptions consciously bor-
row from New Governance models to suggest an approach to
regulation of the sharing economy that encourages experimentation
and innovation, while not jeopardizing consumer safety.
Over the centuries, oversight of the legal profession has gone
through two stages.  The first involved little, if any, oversight, other
than a requirement that individuals wishing to practice law had to
apprentice with someone already admitted to practice and take a
brief, often ad hoc examination administered by a judge or admitted
attorney.  The second stage, in which we still find ourselves now, in-
volves court-supervised regulation of the profession, led in many ways
by a trade association—the American Bar Association—in cooperation
with the court systems of the fifty states.  This oversight regime has
the following features.  First, it is mostly self-regulatory, including the
adoption of codes of conduct with some backstopping by courts, state
legislatures, and tort law.  This system is designed with an eye toward
independence and creativity.  It incorporates significant barriers to
entry to ensure competence and consumer protection and provides
ongoing oversight to ensure minimal competence by providers.  It con-
tains disciplinary machinery to police the profession, including the au-
thority to strip actors of their ability to practice within the industry.
Over the years, the relative extensiveness and intensity of these fea-
tures have ebbed and flowed, with some gaining greater prominence
while others have diminished in importance.
As this Article argues, these same components, which are
animated by a concern for encouraging innovation and professional in-
dependence while ensuring consumer protection and maintaining the
profession’s reputation as a vital cog in our democracy and economy,
are the same that should animate any discussion over regulation of
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the sharing economy.  It is for these reasons that this Article outlines
the evolution of the regulation of the legal profession at a time when a
healthy and vigorous debate has arisen over the need for and potential
contours of a regulatory regime to oversee the actors in the sharing
economy.
With these animating thoughts, this Article proceeds as follows.
Part I provides an overview of the sharing economy and introduces the
debate over the need for regulation of the actors within it.  It draws
parallels between the debates over the sharing economy and those
that have informed discussions over the regulation of the legal profes-
sion, identifying the similarities between the forces that might influ-
ence any approach to regulation of the sharing economy and those
that have impacted the evolution of regulation of the legal profession.
Part II traces the evolution of the legal profession’s regulatory frame-
work to understand how this evolution has addressed some aspects of
the ongoing debate over the need for oversight of the sharing economy.
Part III describes how the lessons learned through efforts to regulate
the legal profession, efforts that bear the hallmarks of New Govern-
ance approaches, might inform the debate over the shape of any effort
to regulate the sharing economy; indeed, this final Part utilizes the
insights from New Governance theory to suggest a way forward on
regulation of these new economic models—one that is experimental,
diversified, and decentralized.  It gives a degree of deference to shar-
ing economy actors to self-regulate, while recognizing the need for reg-
ulatory and judicial oversight to backstop such self-regulation.
II. REGULATION, THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND THE
SHARING ECONOMY
There are many ways that the sharing economy mimics the ways
in which the legal industry has delivered services to U.S. consumers
over the last 200 years.  Before I embark on a discussion of the simi-
larities between the sharing economy and the legal profession, it is
appropriate to define exactly what the sharing economy is and what
actors within it do.  Rachel Botsman uses the following definition of
the sharing economy: “An economic model based on sharing underutil-
ized assets . . . for monetary or non-monetary benefits.”14  I would ex-
14. Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FAST COM-
PANY (Nov. 21, 2013 7:30AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-
economy-lacks-a-shared-definition [https://perma.unl.edu/XV7N-F3G5]. See also
Christopher Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection
Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529,
531 (2015) (defining the sharing economy as “any marketplace that brings to-
gether distributed networks of individuals to share or exchange otherwise un-
derutilized assets”) (citation omitted); Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 5, at 9–11
(describing debate over the definition of the sharing economy).
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pand the definition a bit to identify some of the key features of sharing
economy platforms, including those that such platforms share with
the legal profession: (1) a latent or otherwise underutilized supply of a
good or service that is put to productive use by an independent
workforce that does not fit within the traditional employer–employee
relationship;15 (2) a relationship of trust that is difficult to regulate;
and (3) a need for a degree of freedom to experiment and innovate
within the relationship of trust and beyond.  As I will attempt to show
below, it is these shared features that make sharing economy models
similar to the legal profession and justify a review of the manner in
which the legal profession is regulated to inform decisions about the
most effective way to regulate the sharing economy.  These features
are described in greater detail, in turn, below.
A. Latent Resources and an Independent Workforce
The sharing economy approach is one that purports to take other-
wise latent assets and put them to productive use.  The notion is that
providers who join such platforms will make their latent time and re-
sources available to consumers in need of sharing economy goods or
services.  While it may seem a stretch to assign this feature to the
delivery of legal services, there are strong similarities here to the way
that legal services are provided in the United States.  Admittedly,
though many lawyers today work as general counsel in corporations or
for government, the overwhelming majority of lawyers—whether they
work in “Big Law,” in small firms, as solo practitioners, or in public
interest organizations—spread their efforts among a range of clients,
taking on such clients until they meet their own or their organiza-
tion’s capacity.16  Again, as opposed to in-house counsel and govern-
ment lawyers, they do not form an employer–employee relationship
with their clients, choosing instead to work as independent contrac-
tors.  For many lawyers, they put their otherwise latent and most im-
portant resources—their time, training, skills, and judgment—to use
15. I recognize that the question of whether a provider in a sharing economy network
is an employee of the platform with which she is affiliated is still an open ques-
tion in some jurisdictions; for our purposes here, I am focusing on the relation-
ship between the consumer and the provider.  No one considers a seller on eBay,
an Uber driver, an artist on Etsy, or a host on Airbnb to be an employee of the
consumer of the goods and services available through such platforms.  For a dis-
cussion of the status of ride-hailing companies as employees of the platforms
through which they operate, see James Suroweicki, Gigs with Benefits, NEW
YORKER (July 13, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/06/gigs-
with-benefits [https://perma.unl.edu/ZA8P-EUKW].
16. AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_
2012_revised.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/C5HG-TX62].
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to serve their clients until they reach their own capacity for service.17
Thus, two of the key features of the sharing economy—that providers
put their otherwise latent resources to use in the service of consumers
in need but do not form employer–employee relationships with those
consumers—are present in the delivery of legal services.  While some
could argue that many economic relationships work this way, there
are other key similarities between sharing economy platforms and the
delivery of legal services.
B. Regulation, Independence, and Consumer Protection in a
Relationship of Trust
While many different economic relationships might appear to
share the same features described above (latent resources and an in-
dependent workforce), the attorney–client relationship is one that has
unique characteristics that set it apart from that of, say, a business
consultant.  What is more, the nature of this relationship makes it dif-
ficult to regulate, and a degree of freedom from regulation and over-
sight is necessary to make the relationship function.  As a result,
unlike in many other consultancies, even commercial ones, a higher
degree of freedom from regulation is necessary to instill the trust nec-
essary to make the relationship function the way it is intended.  Simi-
larly, sharing economy relationships, in ways described more fully
below, require a degree of freedom from regulation in order to make
them function the way they are designed to function.  They, too, must
rely on trust, for the most part, to ensure consumer protection.
These similarities warrant a discussion about the interplay be-
tween the optimal level of regulation that will help foster trust yet
generate consumer protection.  Trust is central to the attorney–client
relationship (as it is with sharing economy platforms).  Too much reg-
ulation can inhibit the proper functioning of the attorney–client rela-
tionship.  What follows is an exploration of the ways in which legal
profession relationships and sharing economy relationships share
some of these features; they are inherently relationships of trust
where regulation could serve to inhibit their effective functioning.
1. Attorney–Client Relationships, Trust, and Regulation
One of the central aspects of the attorney–client relationship is
that we cloak the communications within the relationship from over-
17. On the deployment of lawyer latent “human capital” within a firm, see MARC GA-
LANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE BIG LAW FIRMS 90–92 (1991).  Admittedly, this portrayal may be a bit of an
idealized view and at least some lawyers—especially recently admitted ones—are
struggling for work and clients.
96 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:87
sight so as to foster trust and candor.18  We free the client to speak his
or her mind, reveal innermost secrets, talk strategy, and reveal infor-
mation he or she wants to remain confidential so that the attorney can
apply his or her skill, knowledge, and expertise to the problem.19  By
getting the complete picture of the client’s situation, the lawyer can
best deploy his or her craft to serve the client’s goals.  Interjecting
oversight into the relationship would undermine the trust that fuels
the candor needed to promote the free flow of information between the
attorney and the client so that the attorney can fully represent the
client.20
The attorney–client relationship is one infused with trust and a
degree of intimacy that sets it apart from other consultant–client rela-
tionships.  While a business might deal with trade secrets or other
matters a client might want to maintain as confidential, the attor-
ney–client relationship is one in which the attorney becomes more
than a mere confidant.  We may protect the consumer’s communica-
tions with a therapist or religious professional, but neither engages in
the conduct that the lawyer undertakes in light of those confidential
communications; neither makes strategic decisions or undertakes crit-
ical actions in light of those communications on behalf of the client.21
Moreover, while a religious professional or a therapist might offer re-
pentance for, insights into, or commiserate with someone over his or
her personal transgressions, challenges, or experiences, the attorney
can hold in his or her hand the individual’s freedom, the future of
one’s business or intellectual property, or the safety of one’s home or
inheritance.22
18. John W. Gergacz, A Proposal for Protecting Executive Communications with Cor-
porate Counsel After the Corporate Client Has Waived Its Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 35, 41 (2008) (describing purposes of the
attorney–client privilege to promote trust and candor).
19. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1978) (describing the purpose of the attor-
ney–client privilege).
20. For an assessment of the role of the privilege in promoting candor between the
attorney and the client, see Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191 (1989).
21. As the Supreme Court said in 1888:
The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications between
client and attorney is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and
administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the
law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and
readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension
of disclosure.
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
22. Because of the weight of this responsibility, we clothe the attorney–client rela-
tionship with fiduciary obligations, unlike many of the other relationships de-
scribed here.  For a description of the attorney’s fiduciary duties to clients, see
Ray Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract:
A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235 (1994).
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Like those other relationships, however, the attorney–client rela-
tionship is one that is also difficult to regulate on a number of levels.
The intimacy of the relationship, the confidential nature of the com-
munications, and the fact that the trappings of regulation—recording
conversations, extensive warnings in advance of conversations (think
trigger warnings or an explanation of Miranda rights, etc.)—generally
have no place in a relationship of trust, and, in some ways, are a re-
sponse to a lack of trust.23  Thus, the relationship is one that attempts
to foster trust in the absence of extensive outside oversight and intru-
sive regulation.24  The absence of oversight over the communications
is designed to generate the candor essential for the successful execu-
tion of the attorney’s duties.
We free the attorney–client relationship from oversight to such a
degree that we even look the other way as lawyers often engage in a
deceptive act that is designed, ironically, to foster trust.  Indeed, many
attorneys engage in a type of trust-building communication that is it-
self deceptive.  The relationship of candor that a lawyer generally
wants to encourage between her client and herself often begins, quite
frankly, with a lie.  When I give continuing legal education trainings
to attorneys on legal ethics and discuss confidentiality in the attor-
ney–client relationship, I often ask those in attendance to raise a hand
if they say something like the following in a conversation with a client:
“I am your attorney and everything you say to me is confidential.”
Virtually everyone in the room raises a hand.  I then ask them if they
also warn the client that this protection might not apply if the client’s
communication with the attorney is in furtherance of a crime or fraud,
if the lawyer needs to defend him or herself, or if the client is an immi-
nent physical threat to a third party.25  Invariably, no one raises a
hand.  Yet each of these bases is grounds upon which an attorney may
divulge a client’s communication with the lawyer.  Thus, this relation-
ship of trust is one that is often initiated by an act of deceit: i.e., one
that is intended to instill trust and likely has that effect.
Yet, we do not punish lawyers for building trust with the client in
this way.  This is just one example of how the attorney–client relation-
ship is one that is difficult to police precisely because it is supposed to
instill trust of the client in the attorney.  If clients believed their attor-
neys could share their communications with authorities, estranged
spouses, and opposing parties, it is unlikely that they would divulge
23. For a discussion of the role of distrust with the police in the development of Mi-
randa protections, see Russell Dean Covey, Miranda and the Media: Tracing the
Cultural Evolution of a Constitutional Revolution, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 761 (2007).
24. For the regulatory regime of the legal profession, the extent to which it is self-
regulatory, based on standards, not rules, and seeks to avoid extensive interfer-
ence from outside the profession see infra Part II.
25. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2013) (listing
exceptions to the attorney–client privilege).
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their secrets to their attorneys.26  As a result, we must insulate the
attorney–client relationship from a degree of oversight with limita-
tions, of course, like those described above—i.e., where a client is us-
ing the lawyer to carry out a crime, when the client divulges the fact
that he or she intends to harm a third party, etc.  For the most part,
though, we have established a zone of privacy and protection around
the attorney–client relationship that helps to foster the trust between
the attorney and the client so that the client will share critical infor-
mation that the attorney needs to carry out his or her representation
of the client.27
There are also other ways in which the attorney–client relation-
ship, by design, is one where there must be a degree of trust and one
that is difficult to regulate because of the risk that such regulation
will undermine the functioning of the relationship itself.  Indeed, in-
terjecting the State into the relationship between an attorney and cli-
ent, particularly in settings where the State might be an interested
party—like in a criminal proceeding, an anti-trust action, or other in-
stance where government oversight is implicated—poses its own
problems.28  Obviously, the independence of the attorney and client is
critical in such situations, and state oversight is not just anathema to
the attorney–client relationship. It would threaten the adversarial
system and undermine the role of the courts and the attorneys who
litigate in them as checks on governmental overreach.  I will return to
this theme below.29
The need to free the attorney–client relationship from a degree of
oversight and regulation in order to instill the trust necessary for the
attorney–client relationship to function the way it is designed and in
order for it to fulfill a core function in democracy is one example of the
delicate interplay between regulation and trust.  The need for regula-
tion is offset by an understanding that, to a great extent, intrusive,
command-and-control oversight would undermine, if not destroy, the
26. This is one view of the purpose of attorney–client confidentiality rules.  For an
opposing view, see Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L.
REV. 351 (1989) (challenging the premises of attorney–client confidentiality
rules).
27. The difference between other relationships of trust that also carry with it eviden-
tiary privilege is the purpose of attorney–client privilege is much more func-
tional—it leads to direct action on the part of the attorney, unlike other
relationships of trust that often serve more consultative or therapeutic purposes.
For an argument that judicial sympathy toward the attorney–client privilege,
bred by familiarity with it, leads to its relative strength when compared to other
evidentiary privileges, see Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor
the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 465–72 (2008).
28. Monica M. Clark, Challenging Privilege Claims in Congressional Inquiries, 23
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 539 (2010) (describing government efforts, in a range of
fields, to infringe upon the attorney–client privilege).
29. See infra subsection III.B.1.
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ability of the attorney–client relationship to function the way it must
in order to generate the benefits that trust and independence can pro-
duce.  For these reasons, the attorney–client relationship is one where
a “lighter touch” regulatory regime is needed to make sure the system
functions the way it is designed to function.
Similar to the attorney–client relationship in many ways, sharing
economy models would also suffer from a regulatory approach that un-
dermines the very economic models of such enterprises; as a result,
such models must rely on trust—as in the attorney–client relation-
ship—to function in ways that generate the benefits sharing economy
models offer.  This relationship between the sharing economy, trust,
and regulation is an issue I turn to next.
2. Sharing Economy Relationships, Trust, and Regulation
Sharing economy relationships are often ones that are—somewhat
by necessity and somewhat by their nature—also difficult to police
and regulate, and the presence of regulatory oversight can undermine
the very essence of the economic model.  Whether it is an eBay auc-
tion, a trip in a car to the airport, or a weekend stay in a spare room in
a brownstone in Brooklyn, these economic changes are difficult for a
regulator to police.  The nature of the goods or services being offered
makes them relatively difficult to oversee, short of issuing licenses,
conducting regular inspections, and monitoring ongoing conditions
and actions.  Think of a system for regulating restaurants.  There is a
need for a relatively extensive and expensive licensing system and
regular and random health inspections in order to ensure consumer
health and safety.30  Even food cart vendors in many cities require
licenses and are subject to inspection, although the level of regulation
is often much lower than that which applies to brick-and-mortar
restaurants.31
One could certainly think of ways to regulate car services and
housing accommodations.  In fact, we already do.  Most jurisdictions
already regulate many of the types of services that are available in the
sharing economy, through licensing and monitoring of taxi services
and hotels, for example.32  But in a sharing economy world, the ab-
30. Lainie Rutkow et al., Local Governments and the Food System: Innovative Ap-
proaches to Public Health Law and Policy, 22 ANNALS HEALTH L. 355 (2013)
(describing local government efforts to regulate restaurants).
31. See Sarah E. Needleman, Street Fight: Food Trucks vs. Restaurants, WALL
STREET J., Aug. 9, 2012, at B8.  For a discussion of the efforts to regulate non-
traditional restaurants, see Sarah Schindler, Regulating the Underground: Secret
Supper Clubs, Pop-Up Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIA-
LOGUE 16 (2015).
32. For a description of taxi regulations, see Paul Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry
Regulation, Deregulation & Reregulation: The Paradox of Market Failure, 24
TRANSP. L.J. 73 (1996).  For a description of rules governing hotels in New York
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sence of barriers to entry and ongoing monitoring are, in many re-
spects, the means through which the system works.  If a homeowner
with a spare bedroom had to apply for approval from a local authority
to rent his or her spare room, a process which entailed licensing, a
costly application, and would bring with it ongoing monitoring and in-
spections, it is likely many would eschew the privilege of renting out
their home for some extra cash.  Similarly, the taxi industry in many
communities is regulated by authorities and commissions that deter-
mine the optimum number of licenses to allow, set rates, regulate the
machines that calculate the fee, conduct site inspections of taxis and
garages, etc.  If the average Uber driver had to submit to this sort of
oversight, again, it is unlikely he or she would go through the trouble
and expense for a relatively modest boost in earnings.
Thus, just as the interjection of oversight into the attorney–client
relationship would undermine the trust and effectiveness of that rela-
tionship, the imposition of a regulatory regime with too heavy a hand
would undermine the ability of sharing economy providers and plat-
forms to take advantage of their critical strategic advantages: direct,
peer-to-peer ease of access and relatively low cost.  The development of
an extensive and expensive oversight regime would likely have a neg-
ative effect on the functioning of sharing economy platforms.33  Of
course, all regulation and oversight imposes some burden on provid-
ers, but the advantage of the sharing economy approach seems to be
the relatively low barriers to entry; the ease with which needy con-
sumers can be matched with willing providers; and the low cost that,
in many ways, is a function of the first two features: low barriers to
entry and ease of matchmaking.  While any business might argue that
regulation imposes costs that make it difficult to operate, the cost as-
sociated with complying with that oversight is factored into the price
of a product.34  The first thing that comes to mind when we consider
the need to regulate sharing economy models is that they are likely to
lose their competitive advantage should a regulatory regime remove
one of their central benefits—the ability to provide competitive pricing
because the current absence of regulatory oversight reduces the trans-
City, see ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY
(Oct. 2014).
33. Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067,
1112–13 (2015) (arguing for an approach to regulation of the sharing economy
that would not inhibit innovation).
34. Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/
Health Analysis, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 729, 758–59 (1995) (discussing situations in
which the costs of regulatory compliance are passed along to consumers in the
form of higher prices).
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action costs associated with the delivery of goods and services in the
sharing economy.35
Another component of the advantageous pricing of sharing econ-
omy goods and services is the peer-to-peer aspect of many sharing
economy platforms, which itself brings with it issues of trust.
Whether it is a car service, an auction, or a spare room in an apart-
ment, the strategic marketing and matchmaking functions the plat-
forms offer make goods and services in the sharing economy often less
expensive to provide, even if the platform siphons off a percentage of
the proceeds of the sales, which is central to these platforms’ business
models.  Regardless, except for instances where the cost of sharing
economy products and services might exceed those of more traditional
providers (as when Uber engages in “surge pricing”—raising the cost
of a ride at times when services are in greater demand),36 sharing
economy platforms typically offer highly competitive pricing, which is
often a result of the streamlined delivery system that comes from di-
rect, peer-to-peer marketing and matchmaking.37
By eliminating the “middle person,” sharing economy platforms
are able to offer highly competitive pricing, but these peer-to-peer sys-
tems rely more heavily on traditional forms of trust, rather than the
trust that one might bring to a relationship because of either brand
recognition or one’s understanding that a relationship is bounded by
contract law or governmental oversight that often facilitates commer-
cial transactions.38  Ultimately, what sharing economy platforms do is
reduce transaction costs, which enable them to engage in more com-
petitive pricing.39  But one of the aspects of Ronald Coase’s theory of
transaction costs is that the actions that lead to transaction costs
themselves often generate the trust necessary to facilitate commercial
35. For a discussion of the innovations in the Sharing Economy that lead to reduc-
tions in transaction costs, see Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform (2015) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with author).
36. What is Surge Pricing?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/6c8065cf-5535-4a8b-9940-
d292ffdce119 [https://perma.unl.edu/B67A-YF2W].
37. Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alterna-
tive Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 256–57 (2015) (describing how the
“overriding feature” of many sharing economy ventures is their low prices in com-
parison to traditional competitors).
38. Charles Green, Trusting and Being Trusted in the Sharing Economy, FORBES
(May 2, 2012, 2:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/trustedadvisor/2012/05/02/
trusting-and-being-trusted-in-the-sharing-economy/#2715e4857a0b45c3ca9360
8a [http://perma.unl.edu/4ASK-L37H] (describing role of trust in the sharing
economy).
39. Peer-to-Peer Rental: The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9,
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-
hire-rise-sharing-economy [http://perma.unl.edu/L7UM-JTA7] (describing the
role of reduced transaction costs in the pricing and availability of sharing econ-
omy goods and services).
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transactions in the first place.40 Indeed, Coase classified transaction
costs into four categories: search, information, negotiation, and en-
forcement.41  Each of these transaction costs is, in a way, a substitute
for trust.42  Law often serves as a stand in for trust,43 formalizing
these functions, providing rules of the road, and serving as a backstop
when trust is breached.44
The problem sharing economy platforms must overcome when they
offer competitive pricing because they have eliminated some transac-
tion costs is the trust deficit the absence of those transactions costs
generate.  Thus, law and the sharing economy must find a way to fos-
ter trust while maintaining the sharing economy’s competitive advan-
tage on pricing generated by the reduced transaction costs these
platforms offer.45
40. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Em-
beddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 491 (1985) (arguing that contracts can generate
trust).  For a discussion of the determinants of trust in business transactions, see
Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trustworthiness, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 523 (2001).
41. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, ECONOMICA 386, 390–92 (1937).
42. As Francis Fukuyama explains:
[P]eople who do not trust one another will end up cooperating only under
a system of formal rules and regulations, which have to be negotiated,
agreed to, litigated, and enforced, sometimes by coercive means.  This
legal apparatus, serving as a substitute for trust, entails what econo-
mists call “transaction costs.”  Widespread distrust in a society, in other
words, imposes a kind of tax on all forms of economic activity, a tax that
high-trust societies do not have to pay.
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPER-
ITY 27–28 (1995).
43. Russell Hardin, Distrust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 495, 519 (2001); see also Gregg P. Ma-
cey, Cooperative Institutions in Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 757, 764
(2010) (positing that “[i]n economic-institutional frameworks generally, institu-
tions do not so much produce elements that are necessary to rise above a social
dilemma, such as trust, as provide functional substitutes for them in the form of
rules”); Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1717, 1755 (2006) (arguing “[l]aw can promote trust by helping to min-
imize the likelihood of untrustworthy behavior.”); Christopher R. Leslie, Trust,
Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 601 (2004) (arguing that “[i]n rela-
tionships where trust is either not present or not possible, the law often fills the
void.”).
44. Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract
Law and the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903 (1985).  Some theo-
rists believe that legalistic approaches can undermine trust. See, e.g., FUKUYAMA,
supra note 42, at 309–11 (arguing that legalistic approaches to dispute resolution
are less effective and efficient than trust-based solutions); MARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) (arguing that
legalistic, individual rights-based approaches undermine the creation of commu-
nities of shared interests); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553,
580–84 (2001) (arguing that regulation promotes opportunistic behavior that un-
dermines trust).
45. Of course, there are those who argue that more detailed, complex contractual
arrangements are less likely to generate trust and that simple, more straightfor-
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The strategic advantage of the sharing economy is that the free-
dom from a great deal of regulatory oversight is likely the key to the
price providers are able to offer.  While some may prefer a room in a
private home to one in a Ritz Carlton, if they both cost the same, the
typical consumer might be more inclined to choose the latter.  Thus,
the pricing advantage sharing economy goods and services enjoy is
likely the key strategic advantage they offer in the market.  Impose
regulations that drive up the price and one is likely to kill the busi-
ness.  The typical hotelier might say “good,” but, with so many taking
advantage of a business like Airbnb and Uber, there are many bene-
fits to the sharing economy model.  These platforms are putting mil-
lions to work; tapping latent assets; making travel easier, less
expensive and more convenient; and bringing resources to some previ-
ously underserved communities, as is evidenced by the strong support
of communities of color in places like New York City that have been
historically underserved by traditional taxi providers.46
Yet, the absence of oversight and regulation comes at a price.
There are reasons for rules governing the operation of cabs and hotels
that go beyond simply serving a gatekeeping function that protects
incumbents from challengers, maintains tax revenue and licensing
fees, and gives government regulators something to do.  There is a
critical consumer protection component of regulations, especially in
the industries where sharing economy platforms are flourishing.  Gov-
ernment, primarily at the state and local level, must exercise its police
power to monitor the safety of the goods and services offered in these
sectors of the economy.  Returning to the notion of trust, the govern-
ment oversight of these sectors helps facilitate commerce; government
offers its “seal of approval” by granting licenses, permitting providers
to begin and continue operating, and prescribing rules for operating
within the sector.  This oversight serves as a stand-in for trust; if gov-
ernment licenses the provider and the provider is in compliance with
the rules for operation required of the relevant industry, these actions
in conformity with the regulatory regime will engender consumer
confidence.47
ward arrangements can foster trust and trustworthiness. See, e.g., Stewart Ma-
caulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 64 (1963).
Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Com-
plexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 118–19 (2000).
46. Kelly Weill, Shifting Tactics, Uber Hits City on Race Issues, POLITICO N.Y. (July
14, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-hall/2015/07/
8572061/shifting-tactics-uber-hits-city-race-issues [https://perma.unl.edu/T5ND-
9394] (describing Uber’s tactics of enlisting leaders from communities of color in
New York City for support).
47. As President Obama explained, the need for regulatory reform in the financial
industry, which led to the passage of a financial reform package through Con-
gress in 2010, was in part motivated by a desire to restore trust to the financial
system.  Press Release, The White House, Remarks by President Barack Obama
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The recent scandal involving Volkswagen’s manipulation of the
emissions output of several of its diesel-powered engines helps illumi-
nate some of the questions regarding trust that arise when govern-
ment seeks to regulate an industry and a regulated entity attempts to
evade that oversight.  Government fuel efficiency and emissions stan-
dards are one of the main sources of information for consumers about
the cars they purchase, and consumers trust the information gener-
ated by this regulatory regime in making decisions about which cars
to purchase and drive.  Without government-generated data related to
this information, consumers would have no way to comparison shop
among vehicle makes and models and would not be able to choose the
car with the profile that best matches their needs.48  In order to pro-
mote the supposed fuel efficiency of its diesel engines, and the extent
to which they were “clean burning” (meaning they emitted fewer
harmful emissions into the atmosphere than traditional combustion
engines) Volkswagen manipulated the means of monitoring the emis-
sions of its engines so that when tested by government regulators,
they could fool the test.49  Through its attempts to beat the system,
one designed to foster trust and confidence, Volkswagen ended up de-
stroying consumer trust and is already facing class action lawsuits
based on fraud, i.e., the claim that trust has been breached, for these
actions.50  Thus, the Volkswagen example highlights the critical role
that regulatory oversight plays in fostering consumer trust and
reveals one way that trust can be threatened: when regulated entities
seek to manipulate and cheat the regulatory system for their own
gain.
When regulators fail to provide adequate oversight, the public can
also lose faith in regulators and the regulatory system itself.  The re-
cent scandal involving the Internal Revenue Service’s Exempt Organi-
zations Division reveals how regulators, who used otherwise apolitical
on Executive Compensation with Sec’y Geithner (Feb. 4, 2009), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-executive-com
pensation-with-secretary-geithner [https://perma.unl.edu/9HM7-AX29].
48. Such a regime is founded on the basis of using disclosure as a way of fostering
market discipline.  This type of disclosure regime is precisely what was adopted
in recent financial reform legislation. U.S. S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & UR-
BAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2010), http://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-
attachments/070110_dodd_frank_wall_street_reform_comprehensive_summary_
final.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/5VBT-EHUG].
49. Tom Krisher, AP News Guide: A Look at the Volkswagen Emissions Scandal, AS-
SOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 5, 2015 7:52AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/2290770da8
bd4b8c8e9114e85bcbc47a/ap-news-guide-look-volkswagen-emissions-scandal
[https://perma.unl.edu/DP78-ZK2D] (providing an overview of the Volkswagen
emissions scandal).
50. Bourree Lam, Phase Two of the Volkswagen Scandal: Lawsuits, ATLANTIC (Sept.
29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/vw-volkswagen-
lawsuits-emissions-scandal/407800/.
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regulatory mechanisms for political ends, undermined trust.51  We
also see the same tension between trust, oversight, and deceit play out
in professional sports, as doping scandals in professional baseball
have turned record breaking feats into symbols not of achievement,
but of deception.52  Similarly, in international soccer, FIFA’s bribery
scandal, which permeates all aspects of the sport, has caused a serious
blow to trust in the system itself.  In these examples, the perceived
complicity of the stakeholders in the system in doping and bribery has
threatened not only the integrity of regulatory and oversight regime,
but also of the games themselves.  When the customers (here, the
sports’ respective fan bases) do not trust the regulatory regime to po-
lice inappropriate conduct, it undermines the faith in the system it-
self.53  Such incidents of the failure of regulatory systems to function
properly, which, in turn, undermine public trust, are so frequent that
one can hardly pick up a newspaper without spotting them.  On a sin-
gle day in January 2016, one could read of such stories of the failure of
regulatory systems, from the silly (the so-called “Deflategate Scandal”
involving American football and equipment tampering)54 to the tragic
(the Flint, Michigan, poisoned water scandal).55  In Michigan, Gover-
nor Rick Snyder recently gave his annual State of the State address
and discussed the breach of trust the Flint scandal has exposed: “Gov-
ernment failed you: federal, state and local leaders by breaking the
trust you placed in us.”  He vowed to try to win back that trust: “The
people of Flint have chosen a new Mayor and I am personally commit-
ted to work hand-in-hand with Mayor Weaver so that we can rebuild
the trust that has been broken.”56
51. Katherine Levine Einstein & David M. Glick, Scandals, Conspiracies and the Vi-
cious Cycle of Cynicism (Aug. 30, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://sites.bu
.edu/dmglick/files/2014/01/BLS-IRSv5.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/Q2NE-A42Z]
(suggesting IRS scandal undermined trust in government).
52. The failure of Major League Baseball to police itself around steroids led to calls
for outside regulators. MARK FAINARU-WADA & LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF
SHADOWS: BARRY BONDS, BALCO, AND THE STEROIDS SCANDAL THAT ROCKED PRO-
FESSIONAL SPORTS 221 (2006).
53. For a discussion of the impact of the FIFA scandal on fan trust, see Richard Whit-
tall, FIFA Needs a Miracle, NEW YORKER (June 22, 2015), http://www.newyorker
.com/news/sporting-scene/fifa-needs-a-miracle [https://perma.unl.edu/MKH4-
NRCU].
54. Joe Nocera, True Scandal of Deflategate Lies in the N.F.L.’s Behavior, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/23/sports/football/nfl-ignores-
ball-deflation-science-at-new-england-patriots-expense.html?_r=0.
55. Julie Bosman & Monica Davey, Anger in Michigan over Appointing Emergency
Managers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/23/us/an
ger-in-michigan-over-appointing-emergency-managers.html.
56. Governor Rick Snyder, 2016 Michigan State of the State Address (Jan. 19, 2016),
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/snyder/2016_Michigan_State_of_the_State_
Transcript_511676_7.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/94KW-XHJX].
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A regulatory regime designed to promote the integrity of an indus-
try by ensuring consumers are not harmed by the providers of goods
and services within that industry is one that instills trust in not just
those providers but also the regulatory regime itself.57  Since sharing
economy platforms seek to operate with a lower threshold of regula-
tory oversight, they must seek out ways to engender that trust, while
maintaining some degree of freedom from oversight, which is essential
to bring about the reduction in transaction costs necessary for sharing
economy economic models.  The legal industry also faces this chal-
lenge.  It must insulate the delivery of legal services from extensive
regulation while instilling trust—trust in a particular attorney, trust
in the oversight regime, and trust in the legal system itself—that en-
courages clients and potential clients to seek out means of legal re-
course as opposed to other, extrajudicial means of resolving
disputes.58  The similarities between the delicate role of oversight and
trust play out in both Sharing Economy platforms and the delivery of
legal services.  These similarities serve as an additional reason to re-
view the legal profession’s approach to finding the correct balance be-
tween oversight and independence, trust, and regulation in order to
inform any approach to regulating the sharing economy.
C. Consumer Protection in a Relationship Designed to
Encourage Creativity and Innovation, While
Generating Profit
There is a final similarity between sharing economy platforms and
the delivery of legal services that also suggests one can draw lessons
from the latter in service of designing a regulatory approach for the
former.  Just as intensive regulation of sharing economy relationships
can pose regulatory challenges because of the peer-to-peer nature of
such relationships—similar to the attorney–client relationship—there
is another reason that sharing economy platforms, like activities car-
ried out by attorneys, might seek to shield themselves from extensive
oversight.  As in the attorney–client relationship, sharing economy
platforms seek a degree of freedom from oversight so that they can
continue to iterate, innovate, and explore new models of service deliv-
ery as engines of economic growth, consumer convenience, and
profit.59  If an attorney’s actions were subject to constant oversight
57. Turning once again to the financial system, we see the central role that trust
plays, not just in financial markets, but also the role of a regulatory regime in
fostering that trust. See, e.g., Ronald J. Colombo, The Role of Trust in Financial
Regulation, 55 VILL. L. REV. 577 (2010).
58. On the role of trust in the legal system and vigilantism, see Tom R. Tyler, Citizen
Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Procedure
Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871 (1997).
59. For a discussion of the need to balance regulation with innovation in the Sharing
Economy, see Knowledge@Wharton, Sharing Economy 2.0: Can Innovation and
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and review, especially by the State, it is hard to imagine attorneys
developing creative and groundbreaking legal arguments, especially
those challenging state power.  In the last seventy years, creative
lawyering has helped end de jure school segregation and Jim Crow
laws, overturned wrongful convictions, and brought about the victory
in the marriage equality campaign.  Creative lawyering is a critical
font of social change, and the independence of the legal profession is a
central component of that creativity.60
While lawyers can play a significant role in social change, this role
does not need to leave them destitute.  The independence that fosters
creativity can also result in financial gain for the lawyer.  No one ex-
pects lawyers to work for nothing; they are entitled to earn a living,
and the need to give them independence, while serving clients with
zeal, is also balanced against the lawyer’s interest in generating earn-
ings from his or her effort.61  Thus, the lawyer’s role is one that bal-
ances fealty to the client and his or her cause with the ability to earn
an income from the work.  Moreover, the lawyer cannot exploit the
position of trust he or she holds to take advantage of the client.  Simi-
larly, the lawyer should not exploit his or her position of trust as an
advocate for a client to threaten the integrity of the legal system, to
cause unnecessary harm to third parties, or to harm society as a
whole.  As a result, regulation of the profession seeks to strike this
balance between independence, consumer protection and profit—be-
tween the right to a degree of freedom to practice one’s craft while
earning a living, remaining loyal to the client, and maintaining the
integrity of the legal system as a whole.  And it is the need to strike
this balance that makes regulation of the legal profession an ongoing
challenge, even as the law, client needs, and society evolve.62
The best, most creative, and possibly most successful lawyers are
those able to exploit their independence to generate creative argu-
ments and innovative modes of representation in the zealous, but law-
ful, pursuit of their clients’ goals. The lawyer is operating at the top of
the profession when he or she converts his or her skills and abilities
into constructive pursuits that preserve and further the client’s inter-
Regulation Work Together?, PARIS TECH REV. (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.paris
techreview.com/2014/12/31/sharing-economy-regulation/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
7ULV-9SHX] and Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Inno-
vation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116
(2015).
60. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (stat-
ing that Rule 11 “is not intended to chill an attorney’s enthusiasm or creativity in
pursuing factual or legal theories.”).
61. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977) (acknowledging the
“real-life fact that lawyers earn their livelihood at the bar”).
62. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 4.03
(4th ed. 2010) (describing the lawyer’s interest in earning a living as having
moral implications).
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ests, while acting in a manner consistent with the lawyer’s profes-
sional obligations.  In an adversarial system, clients and society are
best served by the lawyer who pursues his or her clients’ interests
with zeal, but “within the bounds of the law,” a phrase common in the
rules that govern the profession.63
Similarly, the most successful sharing economy platforms are
those that have proven creative in translating technological innova-
tion into incredibly successful companies and business models.  In ad-
dition, they seem to operate best in environments where they press for
competitive advantages that often hinge on their ability to exploit a
lack of regulatory oversight.  A range of sharing economy companies
operate in this way.  The most prominent example of this is probably
Uber, which provides mostly unregulated services that look a lot like
those provided by taxis, even in many markets with robust oversight
regimes of the taxi industry.64  Similarly, LegalZoom offers a range of
services akin to legal services but, at least arguably, without crossing
the line into the regulated market for legal services governed by unau-
thorized practice of law statutes.65  Sharing economy platforms thus
look to exploit regulatory “holes” to develop their competitive advan-
tage.  But does this exploitation come at a price in terms of consumer
protection?  And can sharing economy platforms learn from the man-
ner in which oversight of the legal profession has sought to balance
innovation and profit with regulation?
There is an obvious role for consumer protection in the delivery of
sharing economy goods and services.  Sharing economy providers
should not be able to operate in a way that harms consumers and puts
the general public at risk.  A reckless Uber driver threatens not just
his or her passengers but passengers in other cars on the road and
pedestrians in cross- and sidewalks.  An Airbnb host who rents out his
or her apartment or home to unruly guests who create a constant
stream of traffic, loud parties, and disruptive behavior can impact
63. This phrase appeared in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as Canon
7, which provided that “[a] lawyer should represent a client zealously within the
bounds of the law.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (AM. BAR.
ASS’N 1980).  The Model Rules have not adopted this language, preferring the
following: “The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits
within which an advocate may proceed.  However, the law is not always clear and
never is static.  Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account
must be taken of the law’s ambiguities and potential for change.” MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
64. For a comparative description of regulations in the U.S. taxi industry, see
GORMAN GILBERT & ROBERT E. SAMUELS, THE TAXICAB: AN URBAN TRANSPORTA-
TION SURVIVOR 142–55 (1982).
65. For a discussion of some of LegalZoom’s wrangling over the effect of the unautho-
rized practice of law provision on its work, see Raymond H. Brescia et al., Em-
bracing Disruption: How Technological Change in the Delivery of Legal Services
Can Improve Access to Justice, 78 ALB. L. REV. 553, 583–84 (2014/2015).
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neighboring residents.  Guests, too, can fall prey to reckless or preda-
tory hosts, who may assault their guests or rent space that is unfit
and dangerous for human habitation.66  While there are clear benefits
that the sharing economy brings for society, there is also clearly a
need for some degree of oversight over these innovative platforms.
Finding the right balance between oversight and innovation finds par-
allels in the manner in which the legal profession is regulated.
Questions about how to strike this balance between regulation,
oversight, and innovation have been at the center of discussions about
how best to regulate the legal profession for centuries.  These ques-
tions permeate all aspects of these discussions.  They implicate not
just the scope or contours of regulation, but also the issue of who gets
to regulate the profession: who writes the rules and who oversees their
enforcement.
But the profession of law is not just about innovation or even altru-
ism.  Indeed, just as the debate around regulating the sharing econ-
omy has lurking beneath it the issue that sharing economy platforms
are businesses, out to make profits, boost their valuations, and lure
investors, the legal industry has sought to elevate itself to the status
of a profession, while recognizing the fact that lawyers must earn a
living.67  Indeed, any discussion of the scope and content of legal pro-
fession regulation has always sought to strike another balance: be-
tween the obligations of a lawyer to his or her client, to the profession,
and to society as a whole and the lawyer’s need to receive payment for
his or her work.68  This need cannot overshadow the interests of the
client, but it also cannot be overlooked entirely.  A lawyer’s role should
not lead to penury in the furtherance of the interests of the client; at
the same time, the lawyer cannot take advantage of the special posi-
tion he or she holds in relation to the client to exploit that position to
the detriment of the client.  Against the backdrop of the lawyer’s inter-
est in earning a living is also the need to protect the client’s interests
and to ensure the lawyer does not abuse the trust the client has in him
or her for his or her own private gain69
66. For the tragic story of the death of the father of journalist Zak Stone while stay-
ing in an Airbnb rental, see Zak Stone, Living and Dying on Airbnb, MEDIUM
(Nov. 8, 2015), https://medium.com/matter/living-and-dying-on-airbnb-6bff8d600
c04#.r469j9ey4 [https://perma.unl.edu/T7VG-72BJ].
67. Rob Atkinson, Growing Greener Grass: Looking from Legal Ethics to Business
Ethics, and Back, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 951 (2004) (discussing the propriety of
lawyers seeking to earn a living while practicing their profession).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble para. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
69. As Comment 1 to Model Rule 1.8 makes clear, a “lawyer’s legal skill and training,
together with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client,
create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business,
property or financial transaction with a client.”  For these reasons, the Model
Rules impose limits on the types of business transactions a lawyer may enter into
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Thus, we see in this tension—the need to offer lawyers some de-
gree of latitude and independence while enabling them to receive pay-
ment for their services without doing so to the disadvantage of a
client—another key parallel to the interests to be balanced when con-
sidering regulation of the sharing economy.  It encapsulates the inter-
ests to be served and considered when striving for creativity, profit,
and consumer protection.  Since the legal profession has sought to
strike this balance over the centuries, along with the other interests
described above, which also find parallels in any discussion over regu-
lation of the legal profession and the sharing economy, there is value
in reviewing the history of the regulation of the legal profession to
understand the ways that stakeholders have addressed these issues
and have balanced independence, creativity, profit, and consumer pro-
tection.  While no one would say the regulation of the legal profession
has been perfect, one cannot dispute that the history of this regulation
seems to exhibit a balancing of these issues and tensions to arrive at a
well-established infrastructure for providing oversight of the profes-
sion.70  This infrastructure attempts to find the right relationship be-
tween independence and consumer protection, using somewhat
familiar but somewhat unique regulatory techniques, approaches, and
mechanisms.  The next Part explores this history and identifies the
ways that stakeholders who have had a role in setting the rules for the
profession and enforcing them have attempted to strike the balance
between these competing interests.  It is to these issues that I now
turn.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF REGULATION OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A. Brief History of Regulation of the Legal Profession, from
the Colonial to the Contemporary Eras
As long as there has been civil society in the United States, there
have been lawyers, but they have not always been welcome.  During
the Colonial Era, they were, at best, tolerated in some colonies and
outlawed in others.71  By the time of the American Revolution, how-
ever, many had risen to prominence, and nearly half of the signers of
with a client, and sets up procedures for those in which such transactions are
permitted. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
70. A recounting of the centuries-long debate over legal ethics is well beyond the
scope of this Article.  Representative scholarship on legal ethics include: DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE (2008);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION (2000); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’
ETHICS (1998).
71. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 53 (3d ed. 2005).
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the Declaration of Independence and a majority of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention were lawyers.72  Gaining the right to prac-
tice law was not that complicated during the late eighteenth century;
it typically consisted of an apprenticeship with a local lawyer and pos-
sibly an “examination” by a local judge or lawyer, which could consist
of as little as a three or four basic questions about the law, an affidavit
from a personal reference, or both.73  Lawyers protected their monop-
oly on the practice of law by not accepting apprentices, and it was not
uncommon for the lawyers in a community to come together and regu-
late the influx of new lawyers simply by agreeing to limit the number
of apprentices one lawyer could host.74  Some lawyers found that they
enjoyed hosting apprentices so much that they devoted their energies
to supervising apprentices, and the first schools of law were born.75
By the time of Alexis de Tocqueville’s visit to the United States in
the 1830s, the legal profession had assumed a more prominent role in
society than in pre-colonial times, as he would dub them the closest
thing to an aristocracy that the US had at the time.76  Nevertheless,
the anti-elitist sentiments of the Jacksonian Era led to a weakening of
the standing of lawyers in society, while barriers to entry to the pro-
fession were low.77  By the end of the nineteenth century, the growth
in population and in the immigrant populations in the New World
meant an expansion of the size of the legal profession and the begin-
nings of a change in demographics of those who practiced within it.
A range of concerns, some of them legitimate and some of them
shameful, sparked the beginning of both the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA), founded in 1878, and the American Association of Law
Schools (AALS), founded in 1900.  Both were concerned with the qual-
ity of attorneys practicing law and professed a desire to protect the
general public from unqualified rubes.  But the ABA was at the time
72. John V. Orth, Common Law: Historical Roots, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
AMERICAN LAW 129 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2002).
73. For a description of the attorney admissions process in the nineteenth century,
see Carol M. Langford, Barbarians at the Bar: Regulation of the Legal Profession
through the Admissions Process, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1193, 1200–01 (2008) and
citations contained therein.
74. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 43 (1989); 1 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST,
THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 201 (1965).
75. Friedman, supra note 71, at 237–38.
76. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 279 (Phillips Bradley ed., Al-
fred A. Knopf, Inc. 1946) (1835).
77. On the role of lawyer regulation in the Jacksonian Era, see ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,
LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE COMMON LAW UNDER STRESS 20
(1965); ABEL, supra note 74, at 4–5; Mary M. Devlin, Historical Overview: The
Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 911, 918 (1994).
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an “elitist organization”78 that limited its membership and excluded
African-American and women attorneys for many years.79  There was
a fear that opening up the profession to non-white, non-male lawyers
would not just diminish the profession in the eyes of the public, but
would also threaten the livelihoods of incumbent practitioners.  The
birth of more stringent quality controls was motivated by both a desire
to preserve the monopoly of the legal profession for certain types of
individuals as well as the more laudable goal of protecting the reputa-
tion of the profession and the interests of the public in obtaining qual-
ity representation.80
During this period, courts, bar associations, and law schools collab-
orated to create a clear pipeline to the profession, with a preference for
attendance at a law school approved by the courts but also accredited
by the ABA and the AALS.  Whereas many lawyers at the turn of the
nineteenth to the twentieth centuries still obtained their ability to
practice through an apprenticeship, just a few decades later, a major-
ity of newly admitted attorneys obtained access to a now formal bar
examination by studying law at a law school—first for two years and
then for three.81  While the ability to sit for some state bar examina-
tions after a shorter stint in law school and a period of apprenticeship
still exists on the books in several states, actually obtaining one’s legal
education in this way is virtually unheard of today.82
While developing standards for law schools and bar admission, the
practicing bar, through the ABA and local state bar associations, be-
gan to formulate ethical guidelines for lawyers.  In 1908, the ABA
passed its Canons of Professional Ethics.83  These were merely guide-
lines and difficult to enforce.84  It was not until 1970 that the ABA
78. Lloyd B. Snyder, Rhetoric, Evidence, and Bar Agency Restrictions on Speech by
Attorneys, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 357, 362 (1995).
79. Helia Garrido Hull, Diversity in the Legal Profession: Moving from Rhetoric to
Reality, 4 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 4 (2013).
80. For a recounting of some of the efforts of the ABA to preserve the dominant sta-
tus of white, Anglo-Saxon males in the profession, see JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNE-
QUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 63–73, 107–08
(1976).  For a description of the goals of some of the law schools in the late nine-
teenth century, see George Critchlow, Beyond Elitism: Legal Education for the
Public Good, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 311, 322 (2015) (arguing “[t]he goal of many of
these schools was explicitly elitist.”).
81. BENJAMIN H. BARTON, GLASS HALF FULL: THE DECLINE AND REBIRTH OF THE LE-
GAL PROFESSION 135–136 (2015).
82. See, e.g., Robertson B. Cohen, An Alternative to Law School: The Apprenticeship
Model, 38 COLO. LAW. 83, 83–84 (2009) (describing several states where individu-
als who combine some traditional course of study with a period in an apprentice-
ship-type setting are permitted to sit for the bar exam).
83. Douglas R. Richmond, Why Legal Ethics Rules Are Relevant to Lawyer Liability,
38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 929, 935 (2007).
84. Andrew R. Herron, Collegiality, Justice, and the Public Image: Why One Lawyer’s
Pleasure Is Another’s Poison, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 807, 819–820 (1990).
2016] REGULATING THE SHARING ECONOMY 113
passed the modern ethics code, the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, which was adopted in nearly every state85 and then followed by
the ABA’s passage of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, in
1983, which still exist, though routinely modified and amended over
the years, to this day.86
As a complement to these formal codes of conduct and admission
criteria a body of law has also emerged over time through the courts to
hold attorneys liable for breaches of their professional obligations.  In-
deed, legal malpractice, described further below, is a well-established
body of law and mechanism for reining in attorney misconduct, which
has emerged as a complement to attorney codes of conduct and which,
in some respects, offers clients a forum in the courts to enforce those
codes of conduct when they are breached.  Thus, in addition to playing
a role in the attorney admission process, courts also are involved in
adjudicating disputes regarding alleged attorney misconduct.
What this very brief history of the evolution of a regulatory regime
to govern the legal profession leaves out are the key questions and
themes that have emerged over time as critical stakeholders—law-
yers, courts, legislators, and consumers—have grappled with in bring-
ing the present regime into existence.  The next section explores these
questions and themes, and it leads further discussion of the specific
components of the regulatory regime that has emerged.
B. Key Questions and Themes Underlying the Evolution of
the Regulation of the Legal Profession
Lurking beneath this description of the evolution of the regulatory
regime governing lawyers are a number of questions that surface
throughout these periods when the appropriate scope and substance of
oversight of the legal profession have been considered.  First, who does
the regulating?  Second, who writes the rules?  Third, how specific
should those rules be?  Fourth, how should those rules be enforced?
Fifth, how does one balance the need for lawyers against the impor-
tance of quality control and the need to limit access to the profession
to only those qualified to provide legal services—that is, as a means of
consumer protection?
In response to addressing these questions, several themes have
emerged as the regulatory infrastructure has evolved.  First, the legal
profession’s unique role in society demands both self-regulation and a
85. Richmond, supra note 83.
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  For a list of states that
have adopted these Rules and their dates of adoption, see State Adoption of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.american
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professi
onal_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html [https://perma.unl.edu
/DDK5-Z4LG].
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degree of independence, but also that such independence not be
boundless; it should ultimately serve broader societal goals like the
rule of law.  Second, the legal profession should make a meaningful
effort to engage in self-regulation or lose the ability to regulate itself
to outside entities. Third, the legitimacy of the profession and its own
existence as a profession bring with it a need to regulate entry into it,
but the regulation of that entry should not be too restrictive, or once
again, the profession will lose its ability to self-regulate.  Fourth, the
legal profession is one that can generate profit for its members.  These
themes will be discussed, in turn, below.
1. Self-Regulation to Secure Professional Independence and
Uphold the Rule of Law
A central component of regulatory oversight of the legal profession
is the concept of “self-regulation,” the idea that lawyers have taken it
upon themselves to regulate themselves.  While this is not entirely
true—the courts, for example, play a significant role in oversight of
the profession—much of this oversight begins with the profession it-
self.87  Lawyers themselves, often acting through bar associations at
all jurisdictional levels, play a significant role in the regulation of the
profession in a range of ways.  They propose codes of conduct, as the
ABA has done and continues to do, provide oversight of law schools
and monitor entrance to the profession through so-called integrated
bar associations (where membership in the state bar association is a
pre-requisite to the practice of law in a jurisdiction), and issue ethics
opinions that offer lawyers guidance on their professional
responsibilities.
The main argument for the legal profession to play such an out-
sized role in policing the profession is that only lawyers understand
what lawyers do and can take into account the subtle interplay of at-
torney obligations and responsibilities when assessing the propriety of
attorney conduct.  In some respects, this relates to the notion of the
legal profession as a “profession” under the formal definition of the
term.  According to one definition, a profession is “a calling requiring
specialized knowledge and often long and intensive academic
preparation.”88
Let us leave the second part of the definition for a later discussion,
but the first part, which identifies “specialized knowledge” as one of
the components of a profession, is perhaps the source of the legal pro-
87. For a critique of the “myth” of self-regulation, one that spells out the ways that
the legal profession is a “heavily regulated industry” and articulates the harm
caused by perpetuation of the myth, see Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-
Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).
88. Profession, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pro-
fession [https://perma.unl.edu/A7ZU-RHSA].
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fession exceptionalism that justifies self-regulation of the profession
by the profession.  The argument is based on the notion that only law-
yers possess this specialized knowledge and can know what it is like to
study the law; practice the art; bear responsibility for a client’s well-
being; and balance the responsibilities of being a lawyer with one’s
duty to the profession, the client, the legal system, and society at
large.  As a result, the legal profession has forcefully argued for the
primacy of its role in providing oversight over the profession.89
A central reason for self-regulation as the cornerstone of the law
governing lawyers is the need for a degree of professional indepen-
dence; that, when exercising their professional judgment, lawyers
should have a degree of latitude to do so.  Apart from clear violations
of their professional obligations, they must have the ability to exercise
professional judgment, especially in areas where the lawyer’s obliga-
tions are not clear.  They should also have the freedom to make tacti-
cal decisions free from second guessing.  While there are some bright
lines—like rules against stealing client funds—the violations of which
can result in serious penalties, including disbarment, the rules guid-
ing the legal profession offer some degree of guidance but give practi-
tioners a degree of flexibility to exercise their judgment to operate
within them.90  A certain degree of latitude should be afforded attor-
neys, first, so that they may operate in such a way as to enable them
to engage in creative arguments to advance the evolution of the law,
and, second, so they may make critical strategic decisions that should
not be second guessed by oversight bodies or the courts.91
The argument for this independence centers on the lawyer’s role as
a champion of democracy and the advancement of individual liberty
89. See, e.g.,  Allen Blumenthal, Attorney Self-Regulation, Consumer Protection, and
the Future of the Legal Profession, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 6 (1993/1994) (provid-
ing justifications for attorney self-regulation); W. Bradley Wendel, Foreword: The
Profession’s Monopoly and Its Core Values, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2563 (2014) (out-
lining debate over the need for attorney self-regulation).  For a critique of the
justifications for self-regulation, see DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 143-147 (2000).
90. As an example of this discretion, the Supreme Court rejected a rigid set of guide-
lines for defense counsel when assessing the effective assistance of counsel in the
criminal defense setting, saying any such rules “would interfere with the consti-
tutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude coun-
sel must have in making tactical decisions.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 689 (1984).
91. For an overview of the different aspects and justifications for lawyer indepen-
dence, see Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1
(1988).  For the argument that independence and oversight are not incompatible
when it comes to regulating the legal profession, see David B. Wilkins, Who
Should Regulate Lawyers, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992).
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and societal well-being.92  The preamble to the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct emphasizes this notion: “An independent legal profes-
sion is an important force in preserving government under law, for
abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession
whose members are not dependent on government for the right to
practice.”93  Whether it was John Adams defending British troops af-
ter the Boston Massacre before the nation’s birth,94 Alexander Hamil-
ton defending tory landowners in its early years,95 or David Boies and
Ted Olson, opponents in the Bush v. Gore litigation teaming up to pro-
mote the cause of marriage equality through the courts,96 lawyers
play a central role in the causes that contribute to the evolution of the
law, protect the nation’s democratic ideals, and preserve the notion of
the rule of law.97
This notion of the rule of law means that lawyers have a degree of
independence, but that their independence is not boundless.  Indeed,
that independence brings with it a degree of freedom that is limited by
the notion that lawyers must not use the courts to further their cli-
ents’ interests at all costs, by doing such things as fabricating claims
or evidence.  For example, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, as well as many of its state corollaries, provides that attorneys
must only assert “claims, defenses, and other legal contentions” that
are “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for ex-
tending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new
law.”98  This is echoed in Rule 3.1 of the ABA’s Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct which provides that a lawyer shall not bring a claim or
assert a factual contention “unless there is a basis in law and fact for
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for
92. For a discussion of some components of this type of lawyer independence, see
Bruce A. Green, Lawyers’ Professional Independence: Overrated or Undervalued,
46 AKRON L. REV. 599 (2013).
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble para. 11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  In-
terestingly, the preceding sentence in this paragraph links this independence ex-
plicitly to self-regulation:  “Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal
profession’s independence from government domination.” Id.
94. JOHN ADAMS, ADAMS’ ARGUMENT FOR THE DEFENSE (Dec. 3-4, 1770), in 3 LEGAL
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 242 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
95. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, the
Atlantic World, and the Origins of Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825,
844 (describing Alexander Hamilton’s role defending American and British loyal-
ists after the American Revolution).
96. DAVID BOIES & THEODORE B. OLSON, REDEEMING THE DREAM: THE CASE FOR MAR-
RIAGE EQUALITY (2014) (describing the legal campaign for marriage equality that
culminated in the successful challenge to California’s Proposition 8).
97. On the role of lawyer independence in promoting the rule of law, see Gordon Tur-
riff, The Importance of Being Earnestly Independent, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 281
(2012).
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
2016] REGULATING THE SHARING ECONOMY 117
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”99  Thus, while
lawyers should have a degree of independence to pursue creative
claims, this independence is not without limits, and other societal val-
ues serve as a check on that independence.  If an attorney’s practices
within the legal system should taint that system, it would undermine
faith in the system itself and make a mockery of the rule of law.  The
lawyer’s independence is therefore circumscribed by the very ideals it
seeks to uphold: democratic values, legitimacy of legal processes, and
defense of the rule of law.  With the privilege of independence comes
the responsibility to preserve the contours of a system within which
that independence can function even as the system evolves; this is
achieved through faithful adherence to preserving the legitimacy of
the process—the rules of the road—by which that evolution occurs.
Against this backdrop of the need for professional independence is
the notion that a regulatory regime that can provide oversight to the
profession must be flexible and deal in standards, not rules.  Such
oversight cannot entail a so-called command-and-control approach,
one where every aspect of the conduct of the actors operating under
the regime is policed in an exacting and intrusive fashion.  The inde-
pendence essential for the functioning of the legal profession means a
command-and-control approach cannot work.  As stated previously,
the attorney–client relationship is one that must be insulated from
extensive oversight in order to permit the proper functioning of the
relationship.  Such proper functioning centers around the need for
trust, and an aggressive regulatory regime would undermine that
trust by interjecting a regulatory body into the relationship.  In in-
stances where that regulatory body—presumably, the State—was a
party with a unique interest in the relationship between the attorney
and the client (for example, where the client is a criminal defendant),
there are obvious problems with such a regulatory approach.
The freedom from extensive oversight and regulation of the attor-
ney–client relationship helps to foster the independence so central to
the attorney’s role.  The nature of the relationship is one in which a
degree of judgment and creativity is essential to the very functioning
of the profession.  Some lawyers have winning, effective strategies,
and those strategies set them apart within the market.  Presumably,
they help to attract new client–customers.  If every decision of an at-
torney was subject to review and second guessing, it is likely that the
practice of law would become far less creative, and there would be far
less room for experimentation and innovation.  The relative indepen-
dence of the attorney is central to the very functioning of the profes-
sion as a profession.  A command-and-control approach to regulation
of the profession, as opposed to a lighter touch regime centering on
99. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
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self-regulation as its cornerstone, is more likely to foster the indepen-
dence critical to the functioning of the profession.
For these reasons, it is argued, a legal profession exceptionalism
warrants a self-regulatory regime that leaves much of the standard-
setting—some degree of oversight and some control over barriers to
entry—to the legal profession itself.
2. Self-Regulation to Fend Off Regulation by Outside Entities
But apart from the argument from exceptionalism, there is also
another motive that animates the call for self-regulation of the profes-
sion, and it goes to the very need for regulation.  For the legal profes-
sion, the calls for self-regulation have often been motivated by a desire
to fend off regulation by others.  If the legal profession fails to police
itself and consumers are harmed as a result, some other body or entity
will likely step in to ensure consumer protection.  Thus, while some
may prefer fewer restrictions on the practice of law by attorneys (other
than robust barriers to entry), there is an implicit understanding,
sometimes made explicit, that lawyers must police themselves, other-
wise others will do it for them.  An ABA report on professionalism
crystallized this view, arguing that if self-regulatory reform was not
undertaken to combat a lack of professionalism in the bar, “far more
extensive and perhaps less-considered proposals may arise from gov-
ernmental and quasi-governmental entities attempting to regulate the
profession.”  The report continued: “The challenge remains. It is up to
us to seize the opportunity while it is ours.”100  In some respects, then,
efforts designed to supply self-regulation of the profession are
animated by a desire to head off more aggressive regulation by outside
entities, like Congress or state legislative bodies, entities that will be,
no doubt, populated to a certain extent by lawyers, but by no means
exclusively.
Thus, self-regulation has what I might call a marketing compo-
nent.  The fact that self-regulation exists has itself a role to play in
fending off regulation by others—to inoculate the profession from at-
tempts by others to regulate it.
If regulation of the profession is handed over to those outside of the
profession, would the profession lose its status qua profession?  Would
the profession lose control over the activities of the individuals within
it?  Will those outside entities, whose members do not share the same
specialized knowledge as those within the profession, truly appreciate
the responsibilities and the special obligations imposed on the profes-
sion such that they can serve effectively in an oversight role?
100. AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SER-
VICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 56 (1986).
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But the legal profession, in pressing for and guarding self-regula-
tion, must strike a delicate balance.  It certainly can step in where the
absence of regulation threatens consumer and societal interests in or-
der to ward off extensive outside oversight,101 but overly aggressive
regulation can also generate calls for a softening of the rules gov-
erning the profession.  Indeed, we may be at a key inflection point
where the balance threatens to tip in the other direction: toward less
attorney regulation, not more.  Just as calls for oversight of attorneys
to ensure that consumers are protected from advocates of poor quality,
in the name of consumer protection, some may argue against overly
aggressive attorney regulation, particularly as such regulation may
relate to the creation of aggressive barriers to entry.  Entities like
LegalZoom and others are testing the boundaries of unauthorized
practice of law protections.  If such entities provide effective services
at reasonable rates, a groundswell of support may arise from the pub-
lic that such services are desired more than it wants zealous monitor-
ing of the boundaries of the practice of law.102  Similarly, as the
employment rates of recent law school graduates remain unacceptably
low, there have been calls for stiffer oversight of the law schools by the
U.S. Department of Education, which could weaken the role of the
ABA and AALS in law school accreditation.103
Another component of self-regulation, undertaken with an eye to-
ward fending off greater outside oversight and related to the idea that
the profession is best situated to oversee itself, is that when attorneys
practice together, lawyers with supervisory authority will be held re-
sponsible for failing to have appropriate protections in place to ensure
the lawyers acting within the firm uphold their ethical obligations.104
Supervisory attorneys are also responsible for the functioning of non-
lawyer staff,105 and even so-called “subordinate” lawyers are required
to ensure that they and their supervisors uphold their ethical obliga-
tions.106  “Self-regulation begins at home” could be the motto, and
101. Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys’ Su-
pervisory Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 259, 260–261 (1994) (arguing that “pub-
lic outcry against lawyers might be loud enough to mark the end of the
profession’s privilege of self-regulation” if the profession does not ensure mean-
ingful punishment of breaches of ethics).
102. For an argument for considering barriers to entry to the profession in light of the
needs of the public, see Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the
Profession or the Public? Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 2587 (2014).
103. News Release, Coburn, Boxer Call for Department of Education to Examine
Questions of Law School Transparency, Office of Senator Barbara Boxer (Oct. 14,
2011), https://www.boxer.senate.gov/?p=release&id=492 [https://perma.unl.edu/
EK4M-FZMC].
104. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
105. Id. r. 5.3.
106. Id. r. 5.2.
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some degree of independence for the lawyer brings with it the under-
standing that when lawyers act together, they can be held responsible
for the actions of those with whom they formally associate.  Again,
however, a degree of independence is built into the system, as supervi-
sory lawyers are held responsible only when they fail to have appro-
priate controls in place to prevent unethical behavior, or when they
know or should have known of the lawyer’s unethical conduct such
that they could have taken steps to avoid or mitigate the harms that
were the consequence of that conduct.
3. Barriers to Entry
The delicate balance between fending off stiffer regulation while
not restricting consumer access to justice reveals another consistent
theme in the history of the regulation of the legal profession: the de-
sire to control entry to the profession to ward off outside competition
and maintain the profession’s control over the supply of individuals
who can carry out the tasks that lawyers perform.  Whether it was
early American attorneys limiting the number of apprentices they
would mentor to restrict the flow of new lawyers into the field or the
ABA and AALS limiting the number of law schools that may exist, the
legal profession has always played a role in restricting access to the
profession.  While the imposition of strong and high barriers to entry
has a consumer protection component to it because it strives to ensure
only qualified practitioners are allowed to practice law, it also has the
effect of limiting access to the legal profession for consumers.  Impose
impenetrable or unreasonable barriers in the name of consumer pro-
tection and one makes access to justice more unattainable, which it-
self has important consumer protection effects.  If limits on entry into
the profession keep enough prospective lawyers out of the profession,
coupled with a monopoly for the profession over the practice of law,
soon enough, voices will emerge that call for lowering those barriers or
to take control over the barriers away from the profession that stands
to gain the most from them.
Efforts to restrict access to the profession have not always been
successful, and over the last few years in particular, the legal profes-
sion has ceded much ground in this area, dropping the fight to fend off
non-lawyer handling of many real estate transactions and providing
tax guidance.  Recently, Washington State has authorized the licens-
ing of “limited licenses” to non-lawyers to provide services in discrete
areas of law, particularly family law, permitting these licensees to
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handle divorces, child custody matters, and other areas within that
field.107
Thus, another component of the notion of self-regulation is the idea
that lawyers should play a significant role in policing the boundaries
of the profession—to have a say in erecting and maintaining the barri-
ers to entry to the profession that helps to protect the reputation of
lawyers by ensuring only qualified individuals enter and provide ser-
vices through the profession.  Once again, the argument is that law-
yers know best what it is lawyers do, and thus members of the
profession should have a say in who becomes a member of that profes-
sion.  This protection is also directly related to consumer protection: if
only qualified, trained, and competent individuals are admitted into
the ranks of the profession, it will preserve the interests of the public
in receiving qualified and competent services.  Here we see the second
half of the definition of the profession cited earlier coming into play:
i.e, the idea that a profession may be joined only after “long and inten-
sive academic preparation.”
Such controls ultimately have the effect of controlling the flow of
individuals into the profession, with obvious impacts on the cost and
availability of services.  Thus, one of the central themes of the regula-
tory scheme that has evolved over the years to cover the legal profes-
sion is the notion that members of the profession must guard and
enforce the barriers to entry to preserve the reputation of the profes-
sion, provide a degree of consumer protection, and regulate the num-
ber of attorneys available in the market as a way of preserving the
market share of the incumbent members of the profession.
4. The Right to a Livelihood
In addition to internal checks on lawyer conduct that serve as a
means of regulating attorney independence, another check on the law-
yer’s discretion and independence to serve the client is that the lawyer
is not obligated to take whatever steps are necessary to serve the cli-
ent to the point of his or her own penury.  The pursuit of their client’s
interests is undertaken with an eye toward their own interest in earn-
ing a living, and no lawyer must bankrupt him- or herself to carry out
the wishes of a client.  One aspect of this is that a tension can arise
because what a client may want the lawyer to do may be inconsistent
with his or her professional obligations.  And by not doing what the
client wants, a lawyer may jeopardize his or her relationship with that
client.  As the ABA recognizes, many ethical dilemmas an attorney
may face arise when he or she must choose between honoring a client’s
107. See Limited License Legal Technician Program, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://
www.wsba.org/licensing-and-lawyer-conduct/limited-licenses/legal-technicians
[https://perma.unl.edu/6HJH-36YU].
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wishes (and keeping that client as a result) and acting within his or
her ethical limitations.  As the preamble to the Model Rules articu-
lates: “Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict be-
tween a lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to
the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person while earn-
ing a satisfactory living.”108
This tension reveals another consistent theme surrounding the
evolution of the regulation of the profession: is there a conflict be-
tween seeing the practice of law as a professional endeavor and one
that views it as a business, designed for profit?  Can these two notions
co-exist?  The profession itself promotes the belief that there is not a
tension here: i.e., that the profession can exist as a profession, while
permitting its members to earn a living (sometimes one that is ex-
tremely lucrative).109
***
Thus, the regime that has evolved, described in more detail below,
has done so against a backdrop of key themes.  Such themes are that
the legal profession’s unique role in society demands the following:
self-regulation designed to promote independence; self-regulation as a
means of preventing outside regulation; the ability to erect, police, and
modify barriers to entry; and the ability to earn a living.  We will re-
turn to these themes throughout the remainder of this Article as I
highlight the extent to which these same themes might animate ques-
tions regarding regulation of the sharing economy.
C. The Legal Profession’s Regulatory Regime
From these key themes surrounding the nature of regulation of the
profession, a regulatory regime has emerged.  This regime provides
oversight of the legal profession and has several key components: bar-
riers to entry to service providers, limits on the authorized provision of
services, codes of conduct to govern provider behavior, a means of dis-
ciplining improper conduct, an insurance regime to protect consumers,
recourse for consumers through the courts and through tort liability,
and a flexible and adaptable approach that strives to encourage inno-
vation while providing consumer protection.  Each of these compo-
nents is discussed, in turn, below.
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble para. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
109. For a lament on the loss of professionalism in the pursuit of profit, see ANTHONY
T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 11
(1993).
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1. Barriers to Entry
In order to provide a good or service, one must be competent to do
so.  One must demonstrate a degree of skill and knowledge of the field
in which one is trying to enter to ensure that providing a good or ser-
vice within that field will cause no harm to consumers seeking that
good or service.  One of the main components of sharing economy plat-
forms is that they usually impose low barriers to entry for providers
on such platforms.  But some type of barrier to entry is required, and
that should hinge on the risk associated with the provision of the good
or service.  Many sharing economy platforms fall short in conducting
an adequate level of screening of their providers, which is a by-product
of having few barriers to entry.  Unlike in most sharing economy con-
texts, however, where few barriers to entry exist, the legal profession
has developed a system for imposing barriers to entry to the legal pro-
fession—even if it has done so in fits and starts.  Thus, it has a well-
established means for preventing individuals from providing legal ser-
vices without some degree of skill, training, and a knowledge of the
risks associated with failing to provide services with an appropriate
level of care.
In the legal profession, aspiring lawyers must generally overcome
three barriers to entry.  First, they must enroll in an ABA-accredited
law school, where the accreditation process itself imposes many bur-
dens on law schools that receive approval.110  Most law schools train
their students over a three-year course of study, although critics argue
that this is too long, and some schools are exploring ways to accelerate
the learning process so that it can be completed in two years.111  Sec-
ond, graduates of such law schools must then pass a state-approved
bar examination.  Third, whether it is the state court system or a state
bar committee conducting the review, states also impose a “character”
assessment of the individual applying for admission to the bar, which
is undertaken to review whether the applicant can be trusted with the
responsibilities that come with being a lawyer: e.g., holding client
funds and property, defending a person’s liberty and even his or her
110. For a description and analysis of the law school accreditation process, see, e.g.,
Jay Conison, The Architecture of Accreditation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1515 (2011).  For
a critique of the process and the role of the American Bar Association in that
process, see, e.g., Gerard J. Clark, Monopoly Power in Defense of the Status Quo:
A Critique of the ABA’s Role in the Regulation of the Legal Profession, 45 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 1009 (2012).
111. For a critique of efforts to offer a program in which law students could earn a
juris doctor degree in two years, see Kenneth Jost, Law Schools: Is a Legal Edu-
cation Worth Its Costs?, 23 CQ RESEARCHER 353, 361 (2013).  For the status of
two-year degree programs, see Elizabeth Olson, The 2-Year Law Education Fails
to Take Off, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/26/busi
ness/dealbook/the-2-year-law-education-fails-to-take-off.html?_r=0.
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life, etc.112  Recent high-profile examples of state courts preventing
applicants from obtaining bar admission include a case involving Ste-
phen Glass, a former journalist who was denied bar membership in
several states after he lost his job as a journalist because he fabricated
stories,113 and another where an applicant had amassed over
$400,000 in debt, and was delinquent in payment of this debt.  The
court determined that this fiscal situation indicated a lack of fitness
for the bar.114
Whether one agrees with the approach the legal profession takes,
and there are many critics, it has developed, over time, a process
through which candidates for entry into the profession are assessed
for their fitness to practice law, whether they can master the knowl-
edge and skills necessary to provide competent representation, and
that they possess the requisite moral compass to uphold their fiduci-
ary duties as attorneys.
2. Unauthorized Practice of Law
With the barriers to entry to the legal profession being somewhat
high, there is a corollary to the law school/bar admission requirements
that prevents individuals from entering the market without the ex-
press authority granted through the bar admission machinery: unau-
thorized practice of law (UPL) laws and regulations.115  By policing
when individuals provide services that fall under the definition of the
practice of law without being licensed to do so, the courts, prosecutors,
bar associations, individual lawyers, and even lay parties play a role
in ensuring that no one provides services to consumers that require
the requisite skill and knowledge that a lawyer is supposed to pos-
sess.116  Through UPL statutes, state legislatures typically define
112. For an overview of these admission requirements, see Comprehensive Guide to
Bar Admission Requirements, AM. BAR ASS’N (2015), http://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2015_comprehensive_
guide_to_bar_admission_requirements.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/J7VK-F4TW].
113. Julie Bosman, California Denies Scorned Journalist Stephen Glass Right to Prac-
tice Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/busi
ness/media/california-denies-scorned-journalist-stephen-glass-right-to-practice-
law.html?_r=0.
114. Jonathan D. Glater, Finding Debt a Bigger Hurdle Than Bar Exam, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/02/business/02lawyer.html.
115. Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981)
(providing empirical assessment of the state of laws related to unauthorized prac-
tice of law).
116. Rhode, id., provides an overview of the range of entities engaged in enforcing
UPL provisions.  For a description of the private right of action in unauthorized
practice of law litigation, see Susan D. Hoppock, Enforcing Unauthorized Practice
of Law Prohibitions: The Emergence of the Private Cause of Action and Its Impact
on Effective Enforcement, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719 (2007).
2016] REGULATING THE SHARING ECONOMY 125
what it is to engage in the practice of law and then criminalize acts
that meet that definition when carried out by someone not licensed to
practice law in the state. When UPL statutes are violated, they are
typically violated in one of two ways.  First, someone who is not li-
censed to practice law carries out acts that meet the definition of the
practice of law.  Second, someone who is licensed to practice law does
so in a state in which he or she is not authorized to do so.117  While
there are certain areas of law where licensing, or its equivalent, can
occur without state bar admission (the ability to practice in special
immigration courts can be handled apart from state licensing mecha-
nisms, for example),118 generally speaking, the ability to practice law
is a function of the state-sanctioned mechanisms for doing so (de-
scribed above), carried out under the shadow of, or as a complement
to, UPL statutes.119
3. Codes of Conduct and Self-Regulation
One of the challenges of the sharing economy as it evolves is the
need to balance regulation and oversight with innovation.  One of the
distinct competitive advantages of a platform like Airbnb compared to
providers in the hotel industry is the virtual absence of all regulation
governing hosting through this platform.  It is the proverbial “Wild
West” in that few regulations govern the provision of services over
many sharing economy platforms, and this leaves consumers without
protections and providers without guidance on how best to offer ser-
vices in a safe way.  Unlike in these burgeoning sharing economy plat-
forms, the legal industry is one where codes of conduct have been in
effect for over a century.  These, too, have evolved over time, but they
have evolved to some degree of specificity in tune with the growing
needs of customers and the profession.
As stated above, the first of these codes was adopted by the Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1908, and, since that time, they have been
adopted in each state; have gone through several iterations; and are
the subject of constant revision, reflection, and debate from within the
ABA, in state bar associations, state legislatures and the courts.120
117. For an overview of the elements of UPL, see Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and
the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of Legal and Ethical Parameters,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581 (1999).
118. See, e.g., Careen Shannon, To License or Not to License?: A Look at Differing Ap-
proaches to Policing the Activities of Nonlawyer Immigration Service Providers,
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 447–453 (2011) (describing requirements for practice
before U.S. immigration courts).
119. Rhode, supra note 115, at 6–42 (describing enforcement mechanisms for prohibi-
tions on the unauthorized practice of law).
120. For a brief history of the adoption of attorney codes of conduct, see Leonard M.
Niehoff, In the Shadow of the Shrine: Regulation and Aspiration in the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 3, 6–11 (2008).
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These codes do not attempt to define every act or practice in which a
lawyer may be engaged, nor do they anticipate every situation in
which a client might find him- or herself.  Rather, they serve as both
guides to the members of the profession and the public regarding the
types of behavior expected of legal practitioners, as well as a yardstick
against which to measure attorney conduct after the fact.  While also
imperfect, and the subject of constant discussion, debate, and revision,
they are well developed and sophisticated treatments of a wide range
of issues—from avoiding conflicts of interest to handling client prop-
erty and client secrets.  When combined with the disciplinary machin-
ery described below, they serve as a means of not just informing
attorney behavior, but providing some oversight of such behavior as
well.
In addition, as an example of the layers of protections built into the
system to ensure compliance, these codes of conduct typically impose a
degree of supervisor liability for the actions of subordinate lawyers
and non-lawyer personnel associated with a firm.  These protections
and this liability strive to ensure that there is a level of oversight in
place that is in close proximity to the work that is being performed by
attorneys and non-attorneys on the ground.  Again, however, this
layer of oversight recognizes the realities of law practice and a desire
for professional independence and is thus imposed with an under-
standing that even a supervisory lawyer cannot police every action
and communication undertaken by a subordinate lawyer and non-le-
gal staff.  It requires that, at most, a supervisory lawyer must train
these subordinate actors in their responsibilities and have appropriate
procedures in place to ensure compliance with the rules. Knowledge of
unethical conduct is imputed only when the supervisory lawyers
knows or should have known of the conduct.  Thus, even this require-
ment is not as onerous as a strict liability regime that would make the
supervising attorney responsible for all acts of subordinate attorneys
and non-attorney staff regardless of those supervisors’ knowledge of
the conduct, whether they had reason to know of the conduct, and
whether they had provided guidance and training to such supervisees
of their ethical obligations in advance of the inappropriate conduct to
help them avoid it.
4. Disciplinary Machinery
Another component of the pre-existing regulatory machinery that
envelops the practice of law is that attorneys, once admitted to prac-
tice law, are subject to oversight that has the power to strip them of
the authority to practice law for considerable transgressions that vio-
late client trust and cause harm to clients and the broader community.
Through state disciplinary infrastructure, should a lawyer engage in
conduct that calls into serious question his or her ability to practice
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law in a competent fashion or that constitutes a serious breach of the
ethical standards imposed on lawyers, a lawyer can lose his or her
ability to practice law within a particular jurisdiction where he or she
is admitted.121  This machinery is invoked by complaints filed by dis-
satisfied clients, opposing counsel, the courts, or the general public.
Typically an adjunct to the court system in a state and subject to judi-
cial review, the disciplinary infrastructure within a state has the abil-
ity to receive complaints, investigate them, hold hearings, and issue
rulings that can mete out a range of sanctions, such as private or pub-
lic admonition, suspension of the right to practice law, or its outright
ban with respect to a particular attorney.122  In this way, the discipli-
nary machinery serves as a backstop to the barriers to entry.  If an
individual is able to overcome those barriers and gain admission, yet
then proves unfit to practice law, the disciplinary machinery can step
in to police attorney conduct after admission to ensure attorneys are
upholding their ethical obligations after they begin practice.
5. An Insurance Regime
In the legal profession, lawyers are not required to have malprac-
tice insurance, though many, if not most, do.  When dealing with bil-
lion dollar deals, when a client’s liberty or life is at stake, or when a
client’s home is threatened, a lawyer can face significant liability
should he or she fail to provide competent representation.  States gen-
erally do not mandate that a lawyer have an insurance policy, but
some are experimenting with the idea of mandating disclosure to cli-
ents or even the general public as to whether a particular lawyer has
malpractice insurance.  In 2004, the ABA House of Delegates adopted
a model rule for court systems to utilize that would require lawyers to
disclose to their state’s highest court whether they are covered by mal-
practice insurance.123  The adopted rule stated that those courts
would have leeway to consider ways to make that information availa-
ble to the general public and that states could sanction or suspend
lawyers who failed to comply with the rule or provided false informa-
tion about their coverage.  It also provided that lawyers should report
any change or lapse in coverage to the courts.124
Soon after the ABA adopted this rule, states that had not already
adopted something like it began incorporating it or similar provisions
121. See, e.g., 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 101 (describing powers of courts and other
entities to disbar admitted attorneys).
122. For an overview of the disciplinary infrastructure of the various states, see Jen-
nifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative
Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L. J. 253, 258–274 (2012).
123. See AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION ON MODEL COURT RULE ON INSURANCE DISCLO-
SURE (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/client-
pro/malprac_disc_rule.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/L26B-ZXBY].
124. Id.
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in their own attorney codes of conduct.  One state bar commissioner
explained the reasons for pursuing the adoption of these sorts of dis-
closure requirements:
Why are we doing this?  Is it to make life more difficult for solo practitioners
or new lawyers?  To increase the price of legal fees and malpractice suits
against our colleagues?  The answer is that disclosure or lack of minimum
insurance coverage will have a positive impact on our profession: it will in-
crease our ‘professionalism,’ protect the interests of our members, protect the
interests of clients and serve the public.125
In addition to mandated disclosure of malpractice insurance cover-
age, some states have also imposed professional fees on attorneys that
go into a fund to cover clients who are harmed by attorneys who are
judgment proof and/or have no malpractice insurance.  Connecticut is
one state that provides this sort of protection through its Client Secur-
ity Fund, with the financial support for this resource coming from
practicing attorneys, court, and other officials in the legal system.  Ac-
cording to the Fund’s website, the fund is designed to compensate vic-
tims of attorney misconduct who have no other recourse:
The Client Security Fund is a fund established by the rules of the Connecticut
Superior Court to provide reimbursement to individuals who have lost money
or property as a result of the dishonest conduct of an attorney practicing law
in the State of Connecticut, in the course of the attorney-client relationship.
The fund provides a remedy for clients who are unable to obtain reimburse-
ment for their loss from any other source.126
Similar to a workers’ compensation scheme that protects workers
whose employers flout their coverage requirements, an approach such
as Connecticut’s strives to ensure that even clients whose lawyers fail
to obtain coverage will have some means of compensation when their
lawyer engages in malpractice.
The purpose of these approaches to insurance—with some states
requiring disclosure of insurance protection and others collecting a fee
to protect the clients of the uninsured—shows how the legal profes-
sion is grappling with the issue of promoting insurance coverage for
attorneys as a way to instill trust in the profession, increase insurance
coverage, and ensure that clients who are harmed by lawyers without
coverage have some form of recourse.
125. Yvette Donosso Diaz, Why the Bar Might Mandate Disclosure of Uninsured Prac-
tice, UTAH ST. BAR J. (Oct. 16, 2005), http://www.utahbar.org/utah-bar-journal/
commissioner-corner/why-the-bar-might-mandate-disclosure-of-uninsured-prac
tice/ [https://perma.unl.edu/4M75-X3GB].
126. Client Sec. Fund Comm., Frequently Asked Questions, STATE OF CONN. JUDICIAL
BRANCH, http://www.jud.ct.gov/CSF/FAQ.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/T6GC-
D6WE].
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6. Recourse through the Courts and Tort Liability
Consumers who have been harmed through sharing economy plat-
forms face significant hurdles when they seek recourse through the
courts, either in actions against the providers who harmed them or
against the platforms themselves.  To date, platforms have stood be-
hind the independent nature of the providers on the platform to shield
themselves from liability to consumers harmed by such providers.
Sorting out the chains of responsibility has been a challenge to liti-
gants and courts alike, and legal doctrines corralling provider and
platform conduct and imposing liability are still evolving.127  In the
context of the legal profession, however, well-established norms and
mechanisms exist to protect consumers and the general public alike
from misconduct by attorneys.  These norms and mechanisms have
evolved over time and offer both guidance to attorneys on what the
minimum “standard of care” is owed clients in different situations as
well as avenues for recourse.
First, attorneys engaged in litigation before courts or administra-
tive tribunals are subject to oversight and review by the judicial bod-
ies before which they are appearing as attorneys.  Courts have not just
formal rules regarding the expected conduct of attorneys before them,
but many possess what are known as “inherent powers” to sanction
lawyers for misconduct that occurs in their presence.128  Whether it is
formal mechanisms like Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (FRCP), which requires that lawyers only bring legal claims in
good faith and have a basis for the factual claims they assert in filings;
FRCP Rules 26 and 37, which regulate the discovery process; or 28
U.S.C. § 1927, which prevents abusive litigation tactics—to name just
some of the provisions that regulate attorney conduct in federal courts
alone—litigants, judges, and other lawyers have a wide arsenal avail-
able to them to rein in improper conduct by lawyers engaged in litiga-
tion.  Given the nature of the adversarial system, most of these legal
weapons are wielded by opposing parties when a lawyer engages in
misconduct, but courts can often employ them on their own when at-
torney behavior falls below acceptable norms.  When such misconduct
occurs, courts often look to the codes of conduct described above to
ascertain whether offending attorneys have committed a violation
that warrants sanction.129  In instances where attorney conduct vio-
127. For a discussion of platform liability in sharing economy settings, see Kia
Kokalitcheva, Who’s Liable When an Airbnb Stay or Uber Ride Ends Badly, FOR-
TUNE (Nov. 10, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/11/10/sharing-economy-safety-lia-
bility/ [https://perma.unl.edu/D7BC-Y89J].
128. See, e.g., NASCO v. Chambers, 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (describing the inherent pow-
ers of courts).
129. See, e.g., Gordon v. Obiakor, 984 N.Y.S.2d 421 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (holding
courts can look to codes of professional conduct for guidance in meting out attor-
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lates acceptable norms of behavior, courts can issue a wide array of
punishment, such as levying monetary penalties; issuing a private or
public censure; and dismissing a case, claim, or defense.130  In more
egregious cases of attorney misconduct, courts can refer a matter to
the state disciplinary authorities to assess the attorney’s fitness to
practice law.131
Outside of the protections inherent in judicial tribunals, court sys-
tems serve as adjudicatory bodies to resolve claims of clients against
their own attorneys when the conduct of such attorneys fails to meet
the standard of care expected of them in different contexts.  These ac-
tions can arise as either tort or contract actions or as an action for
breach of an attorney’s fiduciary obligations toward a client.132  Attor-
ney misconduct has been the subject of tort system oversight for over
200 years.133  To establish the tort of attorney malpractice, which
arises under state law, the client must generally show that an attor-
ney–client relationship existed between the attorney and her, that the
applicable duty of care was breached, that the breach was the proxi-
mate cause of her injuries, and that she suffered some damages as a
result of the breach.134  A typical case might involve an attorney fail-
ing to file a complaint within the applicable statute of limitations, re-
sulting in the client being barred from bringing a claim.  If the
attorney failed to act diligently in preparing the case or to inquire
about the applicable statute of limitations, a court might find that the
lawyer failed to act competently in prosecuting the case.  If it can be
determined that the client would have otherwise won the case and ob-
tained monetary compensation in the action had the attorney not
failed to bring the case within the statute of limitations, the attorney
will likely have to compensate the client in the amount she would
have won had the attorney not failed to act in accordance with the
ney discipline but are not bound by them); see also Ann Peters, The Model Rules
as a Guide for Legal Malpractice, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 609 (1993) (describing
judicial use of attorney codes of conduct in assessing legal malpractice).
130. For a collection of sanctions imposed by courts in select reported cases from state
and federal courts, see Judith A. McMarrow, et al., Judicial Attitudes Toward
Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported Decisions, 32 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 1425, 1466–1471 (2004).
131. See, e.g., Kersey’s Case, 797 A.2d 864 (N.H. 2002) (holding repeated examples of
contempt of court warranted referral to disciplinary body for disbarment
proceedings).
132. For a description of the interplay among different theories of recovery against
attorneys, see Ray Ryden Anderson & Walter Steele Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort,
and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235
(1994).
133. For an early tort case implicating an attorney’s failure to maintain the duty of
care to a client, see Stephens v. White, 2 Va. (1 Call) 203 (1796).
134. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 662–79 (1998) (describing elements of legal malpractice).
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standard of care by missing the statute of limitations.135  Different
legal contexts identify the standard of care in a particular setting: e.g.,
the failure to call a key witness or the failure to object to the introduc-
tion of evidence.  Attorneys can also commit malpractice in transac-
tional or business contexts by, for example, failing to negotiate
reasonable terms in a contract.136  When the attorney fails to meet the
standard of care and the client is harmed by that failure, the attorney
can be held liable for the damages that client suffered as a result of
the attorney’s failure to act in accordance with the standard of care.
The malpractice tort regime is now well established in the law as a
means of policing attorney misconduct, and clients have recourse
through the courts to police attorney behavior that fails to uphold an
appropriate duty of care and that failure harms the client.  In the legal
context, not just the attorney, but his or her entire firm may be held
liable when the firm fails to have appropriate mechanisms in place to
oversee its attorneys.137  Lawyers have also been held liable for mal-
practice by the actions of other attorneys: e.g., when an attorney from
outside the firm acts as local counsel and commits malpractice.138
This liability can arise when the firm retains the outside counsel with-
out the knowledge of the client, is complicit in the outside counsel’s
conduct, or takes on the responsibility of supervising that attorney.139
This well-established regime of tort liability has thus developed
over time to respond to the ways in which the legal profession has
evolved, taking into account the manner in which lawyers respond to
client needs, the ways in which they organize themselves to do so, and
the extended arrangements they sometimes create to provide legal
services.
D. New Governance and Regulation of the Legal Profession:
Flexibility, Adaptability, and Local Experimentation
The previous discussion shows that the legal profession has devel-
oped, over time, a sophisticated array of regulatory responses that
135. See, e.g., Fuschetti v. Bierman, 319 A.2d 781 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974)
(holding attorney’s failure to bring action within statute of limitations can serve
as basis of a malpractice action).
136. For an overview of legal malpractice actions in the transactional context, see
George S. Mahaffey Jr., Cause-in-Fact and the Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof with
Regard to Causation and Damages in Transactional Legal Malpractice Matters:
The Necessity of Demonstrating the Better Deal, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 393
(2004).
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58 (AM. LAW INST.
2000).
138. Whalen v. DeGraff, Foy, Conway, Holt-Harris, & Mealey, 863 N.Y.S.2d 100 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2008).
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58 cmt. e. (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
132 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:87
govern conduct within the sector to, first, ensure consumers and the
general public are protected from abusive practices and, second, de-
velop trust in the sector.  This array includes barriers to entry, unau-
thorized practice rules, codes of conduct, disciplinary machinery,
insurance protections, and recourse through the courts.  These have
developed in response to changes in the market for legal services, are
experimental and adaptive, are decentralized such that the states
adopt their own sets of legal ethics rules, and are developed through a
dialogue between the regulated and the regulators (attorneys and the
courts) with an eye toward consumer protection, thus taking into ac-
count the importance of that stakeholder sector.
While more commonly recognized sharing economy models are
struggling to develop the right balance of oversight, innovation, and
legal recourse, the legal profession has 200 years of experience devel-
oping this balance.  One final component of the legal profession’s over-
sight infrastructure is its malleability.  The overarching oversight
infrastructure recognizes the role of innovation and experimentation
in the law and is adaptable to change with changing times, technol-
ogy, and the new realities of practice.140  This is evident in the codes of
conduct that are repeatedly updated to respond to changing times by,
for example, providing guidance on attorney use of technologies like
social media and cloud computing; an appreciation for the need for
attorneys to have the freedom to pursue innovation in their legal
claims, provided they are pursued in good faith;141 or an understand-
ing that courts and oversight committees should not “second guess”
legitimate questions of attorney judgment.142
It has also developed in a fashion that encourages experimenta-
tion.  With the ABA debating the proper contours of oversight of the
profession and setting forth general guidelines for such oversight, it is
in the states, which Justice Brandeis called laboratories of democ-
racy,143 where the explicit rules governing the profession are estab-
lished.  Similarly, the state courts, from which the federal courts often
140. Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution,
57 SMU L. REV. 1385 (2004) (tracing the evolution of attorney ethical standards).
141. The main vehicle for policing claims is Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which requires that all claims are grounded, at a minimum, in “a non-frivo-
lous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law.”  For an overview of the role of Rule 11 in policing the pro-
fession, see Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589
(1998).
142. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 689–91 (1984) (giving judicial deference
to attorney decisions on judgment and strategy).
143. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that “a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country” (internal citation omitted)).
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take their lead on how to handle matters of attorney misconduct,144
set the pace on tort liability and the incorporation of state codes of
conduct into the jurisprudence on the law governing lawyers.145
***
What I have hoped to show in this section is the themes that ani-
mate and the components that flesh out the contours of regulation of
the legal profession.  In the next section, I will attempt to apply the
lessons learned from the evolution of the regulation of the legal profes-
sion to help inform any effort to devise a regulatory infrastructure for
sharing economy platforms and ventures.
IV. WHAT THE EVOLUTION OF THE REGULATION OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND NEW GOVERNANCE THEORY CAN
TELL US ABOUT THE NEED FOR AND THE CONTOURS
OF REGULATION OF THE SHARING ECONOMY
In previous sections, I have highlighted the similarities between
aspects of the legal profession as it has evolved over the years and the
relatively new sharing economy.  As described above, lawyers, for the
most part, operate in the same way many actors within the sharing
economy function—as independent contractors filling their time serv-
ing multiple clients in an on-demand fashion.  Apart from this similar-
ity in the manner in which the two sectors operate, there are other,
deeper similarities that warrant a hard look at the ways the regula-
tion of the profession has evolved to determine if its lessons can offer
guidance into the manner in which one might approach the regulation
of the sharing economy.  Central to the functioning of the legal profes-
sion is a need for a degree of independence from more robust regula-
tory oversight.  This independence stems from the nature of the
profession.  It is one in which the fundamental relationship at the core
of the practice of the profession is one that must rely on trust, trust
which is fostered not be regulatory oversight but by layers of other
types of restrictions, restrictions designed to accomplish several
things at once: preserve the independence of the profession, provide a
degree of consumer protection, and protect the proper functioning of
society as a whole.  The sharing economy shares many of these same
144. See, e.g., USPPS, Ltd., v. Avery Dennison Corp., 676 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (holding “state courts are the traditional arbiter of such misconduct, which
is governed by long-standing common law principles of negligence, fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty”); Alexander Interactive, Inc., v. Adorama, Inc., 2014 WL
2968528, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding federal courts “often look to the standards
of professional conduct in the state where the federal court sits.”).
145. See, e.g., Gordon v. Obiakor, 984 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (holding
courts are not bound by specific rules of professional conduct but can refer to
them as guidelines in weighing competing interests when assessing attorney
conduct).
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features.  It is a sector of the economy that likely functions best
through a degree of independence, but independence bound by a need
for a degree of consumer protection that preserves the independence of
the actors within it but not at a greater cost to society.
While the legal profession shares features of the sharing economy,
the approach to the regulation of the legal profession bears the
hallmarks of regulatory approaches that fall under the theory loosely
termed New Governance.  A New Governance approach recognizes
that there are important benefits to including a broader pool of stake-
holders and decision makers in the articulation, execution, and evolu-
tion of policy, law, norms development, oversight and regulation.  Not
only is it more consistent with democratic, participatory, and repre-
sentative ideals, it also stands to gain by broadening the pool of ideas
and learning from the practitioners who are carrying out the functions
of the regulated sphere on the ground and have unique insights into
the best balance of regulation, freedom, oversight, and control.  By in-
cluding not just the regulated but also those who consume in the sec-
tor, it strives to find common ground and a balance between freedom
to act and control of action.  It also recognizes that there is a benefit to
decentralized policymaking and pluralistic approaches to regulation,
not just to ensure that a regulatory regime is responsive to local
needs, but also to ensure a degree of experimentation that generates
knowledge about what works and what does not and to surface posi-
tive deviance that can inform other jurisdictions and markets.146
New Governance approaches are uniquely suited to sharing econ-
omy models.  A recurring theme in the evolution of law and the shar-
ing economy is the understanding that new economic models call for
new regulatory approaches, and one of the strengths of New Govern-
ance approaches is that they are designed to adapt, to be responsive
and reflexive, and to incorporate change and evolve as facts on the
ground evolve.147  Another common refrain among sharing economy
champions is that heavy-handed regulation is likely to stifle the en-
trepreneurial spirit animating peer-to-peer innovations; New Govern-
ance approaches embrace the entrepreneurial spirit and strive to
146. As is evidenced by the evolution of regulation of the legal profession, regulatory
approaches that some may say fall under the umbrella of New Governance The-
ory have been around for centuries.  Nevertheless, New Governance Theory at-
tempts to harness these flexible and pluralistic decision-making processes in the
service of responsive and effective government.  Representative scholarship that
embodies these principles includes IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Michael C. Dorf,
Legal Indeterminancy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875 (2003);
and Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
tation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
147. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 443 (2004).
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adopt a mindset that is consumer oriented and responsive to the needs
of the market.  As Orly Lobel explains:
An entrepreneurial government is one that begins with identifying its custom-
ers, determining their needs, and moving forward to identify the best prac-
tices that would meet these needs. Under this subset of rationales, the basic
assumptions of a market economy—profit motivation under competitive sup-
ply and demand conditions—are often projected onto public management ide-
als. . .[T]hese developments correspond with the organizing principles of the
governance model including flexibility, competition, adaptability, and
learning.148
Features of New Governance Theory are clearly present in the
manner in which the regulation of the legal profession has evolved
over the last two centuries.  Thus, the legal profession’s regulatory re-
gime both reflects and benefits from New Governance Theory ap-
proaches.  At the same time, there are aspects of the legal profession
that are similar to aspects of the sharing economy, as more fully de-
scribed above.  Given these similarities, it is worthwhile to review how
New Governance Theory components are present in the legal profes-
sion, the manner in which the regulatory regime that governs the le-
gal profession has evolved and embodied aspects of New Governance
theory, and the key themes in the evolution of legal profession regula-
tion that have emerged, themes that resonate with any project to reg-
ulate the sharing economy.
First, the evolution of the regulatory regime that governs the legal
profession exhibits key features of New Governance theory, and it has
done so for centuries.  It has evolved mostly as a self-regulatory re-
gime, a common feature of New Governance approaches.149  It has
been experimental and decentralized, evolving at the national level for
diffuse adoption, iteration, modification, and adaptation in the states,
while encouraging dialogue at the local level, and even the hyper-local
level in individual court rooms as individual judges put their particu-
lar gloss on the practice of law with local court rules and individual
rulings on matters of ethics that arise before them.  It enlists a diverse
range of stakeholders—while recognizing the primacy of the legal
practitioner—in the development of the standards to apply to the pro-
fession.150  It also prefers standards to rules, adopting a so-called
148. Id. at 366–67.
149. For a discussion of the role of self-regulation in New Governance Theory, see Ja-
son M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring
of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 591 (2010).
150. Jaime Alison Lee, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Making Participatory Governance
Work for the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 405, 406 (2013) (describing as a “core
principle” of New Governance theory “a commitment to decentralized problem
solving by local stakeholders, and the ongoing adjustment of rules and policies
informed by on-the-ground monitoring and feedback”).
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“soft” law as opposed to a command-and-control approach, a central
theme of most New Governance models.151
Turning to the key themes shared by the legal profession and the
sharing economy, such key themes center on the notion that both the
legal profession and the sharing economy hold a unique place in soci-
ety.  The four key themes outlined above can be synthesized even fur-
ther into three core ideas.  First, the legal profession is entitled to a
degree of self-regulation and a degree of independence but only to the
extent that independence serves larger, societal goals.  Second, actors
within that system are allowed to exploit this unique position to earn
a living.  And, third, a command-and-control regulatory regime may
undercut the value the sector brings to society at large.  Given the
parallels between the sharing economy and the legal profession, any
discussion of the regulation of the former can benefit from taking
these themes into account.
With these themes in mind, an eye towards New Governance ap-
proaches, and being conscious of the contours of the regulatory regime
governing the legal profession that has evolved, the following section
discusses how features of the legal profession’s regulatory regime
might inform any regulatory regime for the sharing economy.  This is
by no means an exhaustive or detailed description of what a regula-
tory approach to sharing economy ventures could or should look like.  I
attempt to draw broad themes from, and parallels to, the manner in
which regulation of the legal profession has evolved over the last two
centuries in the United States.  It is my hope that this brief discussion
will help contribute to the dialogue around the best regulatory ap-
proach to provide oversight over, develop trust in, and facilitate sus-
tainable, fair, and just growth of sharing economy businesses.
A. Self-Regulation, Barriers to Entry, and Codes of Conduct
Regulation of the sharing economy is coming; in some jurisdictions
it will be extensive and likely drive actors away from such markets.
In others, eager for sharing economy goods and services, it will be far
more welcoming.152  Regardless of the form it ultimately takes, it
seems apparent that jurisdictions across the U.S. and elsewhere are
looking to regulate the sharing economy, and in some jurisdictions,
151. For a discussion of soft law and New Governance Theory, see David M. Trubek &
Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The
Role of the Open Method of Co-ordination, 11 EUR. L. J. 343 (2005).
152. See, e.g., Ariz. Governor Doug Ducey, Arizona State of the State Address (Jan. 11,
2016) (transcript available at http://azgovernor.gov/governor/news/2016/01/ari-
zona-state-state-address [https://perma.unl.edu/Y5VE-J2SJ]) (stating “Arizona
should be to the Sharing Economy, what Texas is to Oil and what Silicon Valley
used to be to the tech industry”).
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looking to ban actors within it outright.153  Of course, one of the stra-
tegic advantages of sharing economy platforms is that they often seek
to operate largely outside of regulatory regimes, which means their
transaction costs are lower, and such savings can be passed on to the
consumers.  Jurisdictions seek to regulate these platforms for many
reasons: to protect consumers, to favor incumbent operators in the sec-
tors within which the platforms are seeking a beachhead, etc.
Whatever the goals of legislators and regulators, some degree of regu-
lation is coming to the sharing economy.  Nevertheless, platforms are
working with lobbyists to fend off this regulation as best they can
across the U.S. and in jurisdictions around the world.154  However,
there may be a better route—one that would impose some degree of
oversight over the sharing economy platforms while preserving the in-
dependence and the self-identified exceptionalism of such platforms.
The sharing economy could take a page out of the legal profession’s
centuries-old playbook and strive to adopt some degree of self-regula-
tion.  Such self-regulation would begin with the imposition of both
some barriers to entry and codes of conduct for sharing economy prov-
iders operating within these platforms.  At present, there are almost
no barriers to entry to many sharing economy platforms.  Virtually
anyone can drive a car for Uber and Lyft; rent out a home, room, or
apartment on Airbnb; or sell goods on eBay and Etsy.  What these
platforms gain by having low barriers to entry—reduced price and
ease of connecting providers with consumers through direct, peer-to-
peer platforms—may, paradoxically, undermine the trust essential to
economic transactions.  It is this trust that some degree of regulation
can help to generate.
Sharing economy platforms share so much more with the legal pro-
fession than simply the form in which such services are rendered (la-
tent services offered by independent contractors).  Indeed, one of the
core similarities between the sharing economy and the legal profes-
sion is the notion that some degree of independence from oversight is
necessary to help these sectors flourish.  For the legal profession, a
degree of independence from regulatory oversight is necessary to en-
sure that lawyers can do their jobs well, can gain the trust of their
clients, and offer creative and effective arguments with a certain
amount of freedom from the state.  The need for this independence is
particularly acute where lawyers and movements are seeking to bring
about social change, upset the status quo, and change legal norms im-
153. Sao Paolo City Council Votes to Prohibit Uber Amid Protests, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Sept. 9, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/da92491a15b0437795c0a3686fd953
14/brazil-taxi-drivers-protest-against-uber [https://perma.unl.edu/CG7Z-GSZT].
154. Uber Uses Lobbying to Drive Expansion, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www
.politico.com/story/2013/09/uber-taxi-lobbying-expansion-097028 [https://perma
.unl.edu/28NG-HBPA].
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posed by state action or facilitated by its inaction.  There is, thus, a
legal profession exceptionalism that says: “lawyers are different.”
Similarly, a common refrain of sharing economy platforms is also
“we are different.”  The founders and leaders of these platforms be-
lieve they are bringing new economic models to the fore that make
consumer life better, offer new employment opportunities, and stimu-
late economic growth.  Some fear that excessive regulation—at times,
any regulation—will kill the economic models, stifle innovation, and
put an end to the economic benefits they bring to society.155  Such reg-
ulation will do this by imposing transaction costs on the delivery of
services through these platforms that are the product of barriers to
entry and ongoing oversight.  The more sharing economy platforms
look like incumbents in terms of how they are regulated, the more
they will mimic those incumbents in price, access, and convenience of
use, which is to say they will likely be more expensive, harder to ac-
cess, and less convenient to access.
Just as with the legal profession, the need for lighter touch regula-
tion is central to the functioning of sharing economy platforms.  The
nature of these relationships—whether it is attorney–client or peer-to-
peer—requires a degree of independence in order for the relationship
to function well.  In the attorney–client relationship, this pairing re-
quires independence from direct oversight in order for the relationship
to foster trust and creativity.  Similarly, the peer-to-peer relationship
requires that same sort of independence from oversight if it is going to
flourish: if it is infused with a degree of oversight that destroys the
central competitive advantage it offers—reduced transaction costs
which have an impact on pricing and convenience—it will eliminate
the primary benefits many sharing economy platforms offer.  What
such platforms are trying to do is to create a new relationship between
provider and consumer, one that reduces transaction costs and friction
in the market, thereby lowering the price and making access to goods
and services more convenient.
But what sharing economy platforms miss is the extent to which
these regulatory controls, which certainly appear as transaction costs,
tend to generate trust.  And in a peer-to-peer relationship, one in
which a consumer is assuming a degree of risk by engaging in such
relationships given the nature of the goods and services being offered,
trust is essential to facilitate the economic arrangement in the first
place.  It is here where sharing economy platforms can gain from a
degree of regulation, while not undermining their competitive
advantages.
155. Koen Franken, Smarter Regulation for the Sharing Economy, GUARDIAN (May 20,
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2015/may/20/
smarter-regulation-for-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.unl.edu/GW8D-
CX2G].
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As in the legal profession, these platforms can choose to adopt self-
regulation as a means of fostering the trust necessary to facilitate eco-
nomic exchange but can maintain their independence and flexibility
necessary to remain innovative and to continue to generate profit
across the range of sharing economy platforms.  If these platforms
truly are exceptional and only those operating within them under-
stand the economic models and the technologies they are trying to de-
ploy, then self-regulation would appear an attractive option.  By
adopting a self-regulatory approach, one that (self-) imposes relevant
and effective barriers to entry and codes of conduct on providers
within these platforms, they might also obviate the need for deeper
regulation by outside regulatory authorities.
At present, some sharing economy platforms have adopted guide-
lines that, either explicitly or implicitly, operate as early stage codes of
conduct.  For example, Uber has adopted a “Code of Conduct” that is
just 592 words in length.  It urges “safety,” “compliance with the law,”
and a “zero-tolerance policy regarding all forms of discrimination, har-
assment or abuse.”156  Airbnb has almost no standards, and merely
urges hosts to provide “amenities” (hosts “should consider providing
basic amenities like soap, toilet paper, sheets, and towels”).157  These
codes of conduct, as presently drafted, are skeletal or merely sugges-
tive, at best, and would require far more detail and guidance to prov-
iders and consumers alike.
Similarly, any codes of conduct for sharing economy platforms
should incorporate notions of “platform liability.”  As a component of
self-regulation, sharing economy platforms will need to assume some
liability for the conduct of providers within their platform net-
works.158  At present, platforms have been resistant to the imposition
of such liability, but this will have to change if they are to encourage
the type of trust necessary to ensure customer loyalty.  Customers
need some degree of confidence that they will have recourse when a
platform provider engages in misconduct.  Once again, this type of lia-
bility should not be anything more than what is expected of supervi-
156. Code of Conduct, UBER, https://www.uber.com/safety/code-of-conduct [https://per
ma.unl.edu/RG3A-Z76A].
157. What Are Amenities and Why Are They Important to Guests?, AIRBNB, https://
www.airbnb.com/help/article/562/what-are-amenities-and-why-are-they-impor-
tant-to-guests?topic=206 [https://perma.unl.edu/E29Z-3W5A].
158. If sharing economy platforms wish to proceed with fewer transaction costs as a
way to deliver less expensive products and services to consumers, they should
insist that they are the ones best positioned to provide this screening and over-
sight of providers.  They should embrace the opportunity to ensure their plat-
forms are populated by providers who will not harm consumers through the
platform.  They would serve, in the words of Judge Calabresi, as the “cheapest
cost avoider”: the entity in the best position to reduce the harm that might be
caused and maintain transaction costs at their lowest level. GUIDO CALABRESI,
THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 135 (1970).
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sors in the context of legal ethics.  A platform must have mechanisms
in place for some screening and guidance for providers within the plat-
form.  When they stray from such clear guidance, despite the plat-
form’s best efforts, those platforms should not be held responsible.
Should sharing economy platforms embrace self-regulation, they
would develop some screening mechanisms that impose appropriate
barriers to entry to promote adequate consumer protection, should is-
sue codes of conduct for providers within platform networks, and
should accept some degree of liability when those screening mecha-
nisms are not adequately applied or codes of conduct are ignored for
want of the adequacy of the platform’s training of providers on those
codes.  How such platforms would go about generating these compo-
nents of self-regulation is an issue I will take up infra section III.E.
B. Disciplinary Machinery
Sharing economy platforms typically attempt to police the ranks of
their providers through user-generated reviews and by fielding com-
plaints by individual customers about providers who have engaged in
some untrustworthy or abusive conduct.  Without more significant
barriers to entry, this ex post facto supervision relies, for the most
part, on customer feedback.  It can result in discipline—including re-
moval—of a provider from the network when it is unwarranted—for
example, where an Uber customer has an interaction with a driver
that turns sour through no fault of the driver and that driver receives
a bad customer complaint.159  Once an Uber driver’s overall rating
dips below a relatively high number on the ratings scale, he or she is
removed from the platform.  A customer may not resort to filing a com-
plaint or providing feedback to the platform for a bad interaction,
meaning providers that operate in an unsatisfactory manner go un-
checked.160  While some potential customers rely heavily on user-gen-
erated reviews and it has become a key source of information in many
fields, from retail to the market for household services, such a system,
standing alone, leaves customers with little direct recourse and few
options for restitution should they suffer harm due to improper con-
duct from a provider operating through a sharing economy platform.
Consumers do not always know what might happen to a particular
provider if he or she performs poorly and may lose faith in the plat-
form if that consumer does not know the platform is taking steps to
police providers who fail to provide competent services.  For these and
159. On the unreliability of Uber ratings, see Kate Kane, The Big Hidden Problem
with Uber? Insincere 5-Star Ratings, WIRED MAG. (Mar. 13, 2016), http://www
.wired.com/2015/03/bogus-uber-reviews/ [https://perma.unl.edu/ND2A-36UV].
160. For a description of Uber’s user review system, see How the Rating System
Works, UBER MIAMI, http://ubersouthflorida.com/how-does-the-rating-system-
work/ [https://perma.unl.edu/WH7D-NDBG].
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other reasons, these customer feedback systems can be manipulated
and run the risk of being unreliable.161
Once again, taking a page from the legal profession and consistent
with the notion of self-regulation, sharing economy platforms would
gain by creating more consistent and rigorous disciplinary machinery
that would help monitor provider conduct, send a clear message to
consumers that a standard of care is required of all providers, and
likely generate the type of trust in the system that it can protect con-
sumers when providers fail to conform to expected norms in the deliv-
ery of goods and services.  This machinery could operate within a
sharing economy platform or be set up by a platform through a third-
party dispute resolution outlet.  The design of such a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism would have to be transparent, efficient, and offered at
no cost to the customer.  The investment by the platforms in such
mechanisms would likely pay for themselves in terms of the trust in
those platforms the very existence of an avenue for dispute resolution
would generate.  And this trust would likely not just maintain the cus-
tomer base; it might expand it.
C. Ongoing Judicial Oversight to Ensure Consumer
Protection with “Supervisor” Liability
Just as in the legal profession context, self-regulatory disciplinary
machinery is not always sufficient to remedy significant lapses in con-
duct, and while restitution is possible through “internal” dispute reso-
lution mechanisms, sometimes judicial intervention is necessary to
ensure a fair adjudication of a dispute and full compensation.  This is
an area where a well-developed jurisprudence has evolved to give a
degree of guidance to lawyers and litigants as to the proper bounds of
attorney conduct, when such conduct violates the attorney’s duty to
the client, and what types of relief will be awarded the client when
that duty is breached.  A similar jurisprudential body of work has not
developed in the sharing economy, and courts are still working
through some of the issues, relying on general fraud provisions and
others for violations of trust and improper conduct by sharing econ-
omy providers.162  Sharing economy platforms must recognize the crit-
ical role courts can play in policing the outer boundaries of
inappropriate provider conduct and should not resist efforts to seek
recourse through the judicial system to serve as an outlet for dispute
161. On the potential manipulation of on-line customer reviews, G. Jeffrey MacDon-
ald, Is That Online Review Fake?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 18, 2012), http://
www.csmonitor.com/Business/2012/1018/Is-that-online-review-a-fake [https://per
ma.unl.edu/HL9X-3VRM].
162. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs. Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 989 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4,
2014) (dismissing, inter alia, fraud claim against Uber for alleged false
advertising).
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resolution in cases where deployment of internal processes is inappro-
priate.  Similarly, supervisor/platform liability will be appropriate to
impose in situations where platforms failed to screen and train
providers.
D. Insurance Mechanisms
The legal profession attempts to ensure some degree of protection
to clients and trust in the profession by encouraging attorneys to pos-
sess malpractice insurance, creating mechanisms through which cli-
ents who are unable to obtain recourse from uninsured lawyers can
seek compensation.  Sharing economy platforms are beginning to ex-
plore these avenues, with Airbnb announcing a $1 million secondary
insurance policy covering guests who suffer some injury while staying
in a location secured through Airbnb.  Presumably, Airbnb is seeking
to instill faith in the platform’s services.  It wishes to establish con-
sumer trust that individuals harmed by Airbnb hosts will have some
recourse if they cannot obtain compensation from their hosts.  One can
imagine such situations arising where the Airbnb stay is overseas—
where bringing suit in a foreign court is inconvenient or perhaps hos-
tile to foreign litigants, or where the host has no insurance, few assets,
declares bankruptcy, or is otherwise judgment proof.  Uber and Lyft
drivers are typically required to have their own insurance because
they must do that simply as operators of motor vehicles in most juris-
dictions,163 and, to the extent LegalZoom partners with licensed attor-
neys in the provision of services as affiliates with LegalZoom, those
lawyers will be liable to the consumer for any malpractice, and, hope-
fully, those lawyers have their own malpractice insurance.
Automobile insurance is mandatory for drivers, but it will have
policy limits, and malpractice insurance is not generally required for
lawyers.  Sharing economy platforms should thus both provide their
own insurance for customers that will exceed the policy limits if their
providers have insurance already and impose their own requirements
that their providers have to protect consumers.  If platforms and prov-
iders are concerned that the imposition of an insurance requirement
will be a cost passed along to consumers, undermining the providers’
competitive advantage on pricing, those platforms can self-insure and
include a modest surcharge on every exchange, one that might be less
expensive for providers, and perhaps one that is so low that it does not
filter down to consumers.  Indeed, given the nature of the services of-
fered, one attorney affiliated with LegalZoom asserts that his mal-
163. Uber also provides certain types of coverage for several of its services. Insurance
for uberX with Ridesharing, UBER, https://newsroom.uber.com/insurance-for-
uberx-with-ridesharing/ [https://perma.unl.edu/VC2M-L9Q4].
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practice insurance premiums for the work he does through LegalZoom
are actually less expensive than that for his conventional practice.164
Adding a layer of insurance to protect consumers accessing sharing
economy platforms may help to provide a modicum of protection to
consumers eager to explore sharing economy exchanges but uncom-
fortable with the informality of the regulatory infrastructure cur-
rently in place.  Indeed, Airbnb and some other providers are
beginning to do this.  This layer will certainly impose additional costs
on the provision of services, but given the present size of the sharing
economy and the platforms operating within it, an economical ap-
proach to the provision of services might entail a system of self-insur-
ance offered through the platforms themselves.  While those costs may
reduce the competitive advantage sharing economy providers gain
through pricing, the benefits in a new, expanded, or more loyal cus-
tomer base could offset those additional costs such that they will not
have to be passed on to the consumer.  At the same time, consumers
might be willing to pay more for insured providers.
E. Flexibility, Adaptability, and Local Experimentation
The approaches to regulating the sharing economy described
above—self-regulation (including barriers to entry and codes of con-
duct), disciplinary machinery, judicial oversight, and insurance—bor-
row heavily from the manner in which the regulatory regime
governing the legal profession is regulated.  It is also informed, just as
the legal profession’s regulatory regime has been informed, by the les-
sons and strains of New Governance Theory.  Central to both the legal
profession’s system of regulation in particular and New Governance
approaches in general is the notion of flexibility, adaptability, and lo-
cal experimentation.  A final piece of the regulatory puzzle facing
sharing economy oversight is the extent to which it will bear these
hallmarks as well.  We are already seeing different jurisdictions tak-
ing different approaches to sharing economy platforms.  In some
places around the world, they are being welcomed with open arms.  In
others, they are being regulated.  In still others, they are being
banned.  In some ways, this is not just to be expected but to be desired.
Different regulatory approaches are central to New Governance mod-
els, and if certain jurisdictions wish to impose stiff regulations or es-
cort these platforms to the edge of town and warn them to never come
back, these are all experiments that generate data.  Will the platforms
suffer under the weight of excessive regulation such that they can no
longer offer the types of advantages consumers seek?  Will consumers
rise up in opposition to draconian measures designed to keep sharing
economies outside of the communities in which they live and take
164. Interview with Mark L. Russakow (Oct. 26, 2015) (on file with author).
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elected officials to task at the ballot box?  Will platforms thrive in com-
munities implementing the light touch regulatory regime described
above, generating a call for such an approach to spread to other com-
munities?  These are all data points to be generated through an exper-
imental approach to regulation of the sharing economy—data which
can inform further iterations and evolutions of any regulatory regime
or regimes that is or are chosen.  An essentially evolutionary process,
a New Governance approach to regulation of the sharing economy will
necessarily entail multiple strategies.  Instead, the models will vary
and the strategies will multiply in an effort to strike the right balance
between the competing forces and interests while stimulating the eco-
nomic benefits and the social promise of sharing economy models.
V. CONCLUSION
The components set forth above, which describe ways to regulate
the sharing economy, are grounded in not just an appreciation for the
evolution of the regulatory regime that currently governs the legal
profession but also a sense of the role that New Governance ap-
proaches can inform any foray into building a regulatory infrastruc-
ture for evolving peer-to-peer economic ventures.  At their heart is the
notion of iteration, transparency, and local experimentation developed
through a dialogue about the best approaches to regulate in this ever-
evolving economic and social space.  In many ways, it is akin to the
very entrepreneurial spirit that animates the sharing economy itself.
It is also based on the market-based principles—but a market for
ideas, not businesses.  It hinges on a dialogue with stakeholders, both
providers and consumers, facilitated by government.  It is centered
around a cornerstone of self-regulation with backstopping by courts;
internal and third-party disciplinary machinery; and market-based
solutions like insurance remedies.  In these ways, it is a reflection of
the manner in which the regulation of the legal profession has
evolved, with a nod to the ways in which that evolution has exhibited
the features central to New Governance Theory.  In the end, the pro-
cess of the development of these diffuse, diverse, and decentralized
systems for regulating the sharing economy will inform an ongoing,
ever-evolving dialogue about the right balance between oversight and
innovation, independence and regulation, economic growth and devel-
opment, and consumer protection.
The process by which this dialogue takes place and is made mani-
fest in flexible, adaptable, and scalable solutions is almost as impor-
tant as identifying those solutions themselves.  What is more, such a
dialogue will generate data.  Such data will, in turn, inform the dia-
logue about the proper scope and contours of a regulatory system—or
systems—for providing oversight of the sharing economy.  The system
that has evolved for regulating the legal profession has generated this
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data over time and that system has adapted and changed to the grow-
ing needs of a larger and more diverse population, an expanded econ-
omy, and the realities of practice within a democratic, yet capitalistic,
society.  Similar experimentation with the sharing economy will gen-
erate the empirical information necessary to empower regulators, the
regulated, and the general public to make informed choices about how
to shape and mold the regulatory system moving forward in an itera-
tive and transparent fashion.  Such a process would help assess
whether the legal profession’s blend of oversight techniques and bod-
ies makes sense for the sharing economy.
At the heart of an approach to regulating the sharing economy that
borrows from our system for regulating the legal profession is the un-
derstanding that innovation and accountability can go hand-in-hand.
Indeed, eighteenth century England promoted innovation and creativ-
ity by loosening restrictions on trade but also protecting property
rights,165 the need to balance innovation with accountability is central
to the regulatory approach to sharing economy models.  If, as Lobel
claims, “talent wants to be free,”166 it also must be reined in through
sensible means that encourage entrepreneurship while preserving
consumer protection.
165. JOEL MOKYR, THE ENLIGHTENED ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BRITAIN
1700–1850, at 65 (2009).
166. ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS,
RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING (2013).
